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Careful consideration should be given to the factors discussed in Part I, Item 1A, Risk Factors, in our Annual Report for the fiscal year ended January 3, 2026, which could materially affect our business, financial condition or future results, in addition to the information set forth in this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q. Except for the revised risk factor below regarding "Operating globally subjects us to changes in government regulations and policies in multiple jurisdictions around the world, including those related to tariffs and trade barriers, taxation, exchange controls and political risks," there have been no material changes from the risk factors disclosed in our Annual Report.
Operating globally subjects us to changes in government regulations and policies in multiple jurisdictions around the world, including those related to tariffs and trade barriers, taxation, exchange controls and political risks.
Changes in government policies, political unrest, economic sanctions, trade embargoes, or other adverse trade regulations can negatively impact our business. Non-U.S. markets contribute a substantial portion of our revenues, and we intend to continue expanding our presence in these regions. For example, we operate businesses in Mexico and Canada and benefit from the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). On July 1, 2026, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced that the United States does not agree to renewal of USMCA in its current form, triggering an annual review process that may result in modifications of the agreement. If the United States were to withdraw from or materially modify the USMCA or impose significant tariffs or taxes on goods imported into the United States, the cost of our products could significantly increase or no longer be priced competitively, which in turn could have a material adverse effect on our business and results of operations.
In 2025, the Trump Administration imposed a series of tariffs against U.S. trading partners pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled these tariffs unlawful. The Trump Administration immediately imposed new global tariffs pursuant to Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, which allows for tariffs of up to 15% for a period of up to 150 days. The Section 122 tariffs expired on July 24, 2026. On the same day, USTR imposed new tariffs of 10% or 12.5% on 60 trading partners under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. In July 2026, the United States imposed tariffs of 50% on certain imports from Canada under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Our business has been negatively affected by these tariffs, and the timing and availability of refunds is uncertain. We may be negatively affected in the future by the quickly evolving tariff situation and the economic uncertainty created thereby.
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KADANT INC.
Our business is also affected by various product or sector-specific tariffs that the United States imposes on trading partners. Certain products imported from China, including pulp and paper machinery, are subject to tariffs imposed by USTR, pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The tariffs on pulp and paper machinery are set at 25%. In addition, the U.S. Department of Commerce has imposed tariffs of 50% on numerous categories of steel, aluminum, and copper products, under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and has expanded these tariffs to include certain derivative products subject to a 25% tariff. We import products that are impacted by these tariffs. While we try to mitigate the impact of the existing and other proposed tariffs by the Trump Administration, we cannot be certain if our actions will be successful. The tariffs have and could in the future negatively affect our ability to compete against competitors who do not manufacture in China and/or are not subject to the tariffs.
The United States has tightened trade sanctions targeting countries like China and Russia. For example, since 2018 the United States has imposed various trade and economic sanctions targeting certain persons in Russia and certain types of business with Russia. The United States has continued to expand export control restrictions applicable to certain Chinese firms and continued its assessment of new controls for "emerging foundational technologies," escalating U.S.-China tension concerning technology. Moreover, tensions between the United States and China have increased and future actions by the United States or Chinese governments may impact our operations in and imports from China, as well as sales to and from China. In response, Russia and China have begun considering and, in some cases, implementing trade sanctions that could affect U.S.-owned businesses. The imposition of trade sanctions has and may in the future continue to make it generally more difficult to do business in Russia and China and cause delays or prevent shipment of products or services performed by our personnel, or to receive payment for products or services.
Additionally, the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine and the global response to it has and may in the future adversely impact our revenues, gross margins and financial results. The United States, the European Union, and many other countries have imposed sanctions on Russia, individuals in Russia and Russian businesses, including several large banks. In 2025, our sales to Russia were minimal at $1.9 million. As a result of the international sanctions regime in place against Russia, it has become extremely difficult to sell any of our equipment or services into Russia. Any proposed sales into Russia are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the risks related to the sale, the costs associated with ensuring compliance with applicable sanctions and the likelihood of receiving payment from either party's banks. It is not possible to predict the broader or longer-term consequences of this conflict, which could include further sanctions, embargoes, regional instability, geopolitical shifts and adverse effects on macroeconomic conditions, security conditions, currency exchange rates and financial markets. Such geopolitical instability and uncertainty has and could continue to have in the future a negative impact on our ability to sell to, ship products to, collect payments from, and support customers in certain regions based on trade restrictions, embargoes and export control law restrictions, and logistics restrictions, and could increase the costs, risks and adverse impacts from these new challenges. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine, as well as other conflicts such as those in the Middle East, may also have the effect of heightening other risks disclosed in our Annual Report, any of which could materially and adversely affect our business and results of operations. Such risks include, but are not limited to, adverse effects on macroeconomic conditions, including inflation and business and consumer spending; disruptions to our global technology infrastructure, including through cyberattack, ransomware attack, or cyber-intrusion; adverse changes in international trade policies and relations; our ability to maintain or increase our prices, including any fuel surcharges in response to rising fuel costs; the energy crisis resulting from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, particularly in Europe; our ability to implement and execute our business strategy; disruptions in global supply chains; our exposure to foreign currency fluctuations; and constraints, volatility, or disruption in the capital markets. Such restrictions have and may in the future continue to have a material adverse impact on our business and operating results.