3. A[Reserved] 3. BCapitalization and Indebtedness Not applicable. 3. CReasons for the Offer and Use of Proceeds Not applicable. 3. DRisk Factors Our businesses are affected by many internal and external factors in the markets in which we operate. Different risk factors can impact our businesses, our ability to operate effectively and our business strategies. You should consider the risk factors carefully and read them in conjunction with all the information in this document. You should note that these risk factors described below are not the only risks to consider. Rather, these are the risks that we currently consider material. There may be additional risks that we consider immaterial or of which we are unaware, and any of these risks could have similar effects to those set forth below. Credicorp is exposed to the following macroeconomic, legal and regulatory, industry and market, business performance, operational and environmental and social and governance risks: •Our business is exposed to risks related to political and socioeconomic conditions in Peru. •Our banking and capital market operations in neighboring countries expose us to risks related to political and economic conditions in those countries. •Economic and market conditions in other countries may affect the Peruvian economy and the market price of Peruvian securities. •Geopolitical tensions and conflict, including the conflicts between Russia and Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, could have economic effects that could negatively impact the Peruvian economy. •Regulatory changes and the adoption of new international guidelines to sectors in which we operate could adversely affect our earnings and our operating performance. •Credicorp, as a Bermuda exempted company, may be adversely affected by any change in Bermuda law or regulation. •It may be difficult to serve process on or enforce judgments against us or our principals residing outside of the United States or to assert claims against our officers or Directors. 12 Table of Contents •Medical malpractice claims, professional negligence and adverse clinical outcomes that may arise from our medical services operations could lead to significant financial liabilities. These situations have the potential to not only result in substantial legal and settlement costs but also to cause reputational harm. •We operate in a competitive environment that may limit our potential to grow and may put pressure on our margins and reduce our profitability. •Our business and results of operations could be negatively impacted by a pandemic virus outbreak or other public health crises beyond our control. •Our financial statements, particularly our interest-earning assets and interest-bearing liabilities, could be exposed to fluctuations in interest rates, foreign currency exchange rates and exchange controls, which may adversely affect our financial condition and results of operations. •Liquidity risks are inherent in our business activities. •Our liquidity, business activities and profitability may be adversely affected by an inability to access the debt capital markets or to sell assets during periods of market-wide or firm-specific liquidity constraints. •The Group relies significantly on its deposits for funding. •Our investments measured at fair value through profit or loss and fair value through other comprehensive income expose us to market price volatility, liquidity declines and fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates, which may result in losses that could adversely affect our business, financial condition and operating results. In addition, our investments measured at amortized cost may expose us to market price volatility and liquidity shortcomings if sales of those investments become required for liquidity purposes. •A deterioration in the quality of our loan portfolio may adversely affect our results of operations. •Errors or inaccuracies in risk models can have an adverse economic impact on our business, financial condition and results of operations. •Accurate underwriting and setting of premiums are important risk management tools for primary insurance companies, such as Grupo Pacífico, but the estimates underlying our underwriting and premiums may be inaccurate. •While reinsurance is a tool for risk diversification that may help to reduce losses for a primary insurance company such as Grupo Pacífico, we face the possibility that the reinsured amount will be insufficient to fully cover incurred losses or that the reinsurance companies will be unable to honor their contractual obligations. •Risks not contemplated in our insurance policies may affect our results of operations. •Acquisitions, strategic partnerships and investments may not perform as expected, which could have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations. •Credicorp’s increasing investments in digital transformation and disruptive initiatives may fail to achieve the ambitions, efficiencies, and other performance improvements that it is pursuing. •The shortage of specialized talent can negatively affect the implementation of our strategy. •Our ability to pay dividends to shareholders and to pay corporate expenses may be adversely affected by the ability of our subsidiaries to pay dividends to us. •A failure in, or breach of, our operational or security systems, fraud by our employees or outsiders, and other operational errors of our internal controls system could temporarily interrupt our businesses, increase our costs and cause losses. •Our Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Terrorist Financing (CTF) measures are designed to safeguard our operations and uphold the highest standards of compliance; however, no system can guarantee absolute prevention, and we may not be able to prevent third parties from using as a conduit for illicit activities. While our framework significantly reduces the likelihood of illicit activities and reinforces the integrity of our business, any failure could damage our reputation or expose us to fines, sanctions or legal enforcement, any of which could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations. •Natural disasters in Peru and in the countries where we operate could disrupt our businesses and affect our results of operations and financial condition. •We may incur financial losses and damages to our reputation from ESG risks, which recently have been recognized as increasingly relevant because they can affect business continuity and the creation of long-term value for our stakeholders. 13 Table of Contents Macroeconomic Risks Our business is exposed to risks related to political and socioeconomic conditions in Peru Most operations of BCP Stand-alone, Grupo Pacífico, and Prima AFP, and a significant part of Credicorp Capital’s and Mibanco’s operations, are located in Peru. In addition, while ASB Bank Corp. is based in Panama rather than in Peru, most of its customers are located in Peru. Therefore, our results primarily depend on economic activity in Peru. Changes in economic conditions, government policies and social uncertainty can alter the financial health and regular development of our businesses. These changes may include, but are not limited to, high inflation, currency depreciation, currency exchange controls, caps on interest rates, confiscation of private property and changes in financial regulation. Similarly, political and social unrest, corruption scandals and deteriorations in public security conditions - such as increased criminal activity or extortion - affecting Peru could adversely impact our operations. Political Conditions Peru experienced one of its worst social and political crises in more than two decades after a failed coup on December 7, 2022, by former President Pedro Castillo, which triggered and exacerbated massive protests. On the day of a debate by Peru’s Congress on a third motion to impeach Castillo, he announced in a message to the Nation the temporary dissolution of Peru’s Congress, new elections for a Congress with the power to reform Peru’s constitution, and the restructuring of Peru’s justice system. The police and armed forces opposed the coup, releasing a joint statement saying that any act contrary to the established constitutional order was a violation of the constitution and that they would not abide by it. Within hours of his speech, Peru’s Congress voted to remove Castillo from office due to moral incapacity and he was arrested on charges of rebellion and conspiracy. Vice President Dina Boluarte was sworn in as Peru’s first female president and indicated that she plans to govern until July 2026, when Castillo’s term would have ended. Between December 2022, when Boluarte took office, and the first months of 2023, social unrest increased, mainly in southern regions of Peru which represent around 15% of Peru’s GDP, where Castillo had more support. Protesters demanded the release of former President Castillo and the holding of new general elections. Protests were violent and resulted in supply chain disruptions due to road blockages, and some regional airports suspended operations temporarily as infrastructure was damaged. Additionally, some mining operations were also disrupted as they faced road blockages and supply shortages. Furthermore, the protest negatively affected the tourism, hospitality, transportation, construction, and retail sectors. These protests ended in February 2023. According to the Ombudsman’s office, the conflict linked to the political crisis caused at least 60 deaths as a result of clashes between civilians, police, and the military. Since then, other attempts of social protest have not gained much traction. However, there can be no assurance that similar social unrest will not occur in the future. In the context of social unrest, on December 12, 2022, a bill was initially approved by Congress to hold early elections in April 2024. Thereafter, political parties asked for a reconsideration of the bill which would move the date for the elections earlier to October 2023. On January 29, 2023, the reconsidered bill did not obtain the required superior majority (87 of 130 votes), which voided the initially approved initiative. Two months later, in March 2023, the executive branch presented another bill for early elections in December 2023, which was again rejected. On June 15, 2023, President Boluarte indicated to press that early elections in 2024 were a ‘closed topic’ and that her government would remain in office until July 2026, which is the initial end date of Castillo’s term. In 2025, the last year of former President Boluarte's term, Congress had the authority to remove her from office without the need to call for early elections once she announces the election date. Removing the president required a motion of vacancy to be signed by at least 20% of Congress (26 signatures). The motion then had to be admitted to debate with the favorable vote of 40% of Congress. Finally, approving the vacancy required a qualified majority of at least two‑thirds of the legal number of congressmen, the equivalent of 87 out of 130 votes. This process was ultimately carried out, and on October 10th, 122 members of Congress voted to remove Boluarte from office due to her declared ‘permanent moral incapacity’, citing the government’s failure to control rampant crime and insecurity. The position of the president is assumed by the vice president or, in their absence, by the president of Congress, without the need to call for early elections. As such, and given that Boluarte had no vice president, the then‑President of Congress, José Jerí, took office following the congressional vote. He was an elected congressman from the Somos Perú party. However, Jerí’s tenure was short‑lived: on February 17, 2026, Congress approved multiple motions of censure against him (in his capacity as President of Congress and, by succession, interim President of the Republic), which resulted in his immediate removal and the declaration of the position of the presidency as vacant. Following Jerí’s removal, Congress proceeded to elect a new congressional leader who, by constitutional succession, assumed the presidency; José María Balcázar subsequently took office as President of the Republic on a transitional basis. 14 Table of Contents On March 25, 2025, former President Dina Boluarte called for general elections to be held on April 12, 2026, in which Peruvians will elect a new President, members of Congress and the Senate of a restored bicameral legislature, as well as representatives to the Andean Parliament. Under the new bicameral system, removing the president requires a vacancy motion to be initiated in the Chamber of Deputies, signed by at least 30% of its members (39 signatures). The motion must first be admitted to debate with the favorable vote of 40% of deputies. To approve the vacancy at this stage, a qualified majority of two‑thirds of the legal number of deputies (87 out of 130 votes) is required. Once approved, the decision is submitted to the Senate, where the president may again present a defense. The vacancy is finalized only if it is ratified by a two‑thirds majority of the legal number of senators (40 out of 60 votes). As of now, 38 political parties are officially registered to participate in these elections. The 2026 elections will mark the return to a bicameral Congress following the approval by Congress of a constitutional reform that introduces a Senate with at least 60 seats and allows for consecutive legislative reelection. According to Moody’s, this constitutional overhaul aims to strengthen institutional checks and balances, although its effectiveness will depend on implementation and political dynamics following the elections. Peru's 2026 presidential election moved to a runoff after no candidate secured a majority in the first round (12–13 April). Keiko Fujimori leads with about 17% and is expected to advance to the June 7 runoff. The second finalist remains uncertain: Roberto Sánchez is ahead of Rafael López Aliaga by less than 20,000 votes and some tally sheets are still under review, so confirmation may take until mid-May. The fragmented vote underscores Peru’s divided political landscape and the final runoff pairing hinges on completing the official count and resolving appeals. The general elections of 2021 resulted in an environment of political and social polarization, and general elections in 2026 could have a similar result. The Peruvian Congress remains highly fragmented, as no political party has a clear majority and at least 10 political parties hold minority representations. Former president Boluarte assumed the presidency with no parliamentary bench as she was expelled from the political party Peru Libre at the beginning of 2021 for ideological differences. President Dina Boluarte left office on October 10, 2025 with an approval rating of only 3%, according to the September 2025 Ipsos Survey, underscoring the fragility of Peru’s political environment as the country moves toward the 2026 general elections. This instability intensified under President José Jerí, against whom Congress filed seven impeachment motions invoking “permanent moral incapacity.” One of these motions was ultimately successful, leading to President Jerí’s removal from office on February 17, 2026. The impeachment proceedings were based on allegations that President Jerí held non‑registered meetings with a Chinese businessman, purportedly in violation of Peru’s Law on the Management of Interests, raising significant concerns regarding transparency and potential conflicts of interest. Following his removal, Congress elected José María Balcázar of the Perú Libre party—who was associated with former president Pedro Castillo—as president, securing 60 votes in a second‑round vote against María del Carmen Alva (political party Acción Popular). Denisse Miralles, who previously served as Minister of Economy in President Jerí’s cabinet, was appointed Prime Minister. There can be no assurance that future developments in or affecting the Peruvian political landscape, including economic, social or political instability, will not materially and adversely affect our business, financial condition or results of operations. The risk that a future government may revive the debate over adopting a new constitution remains. To replace the current constitution through a constituent assembly, a constitutional reform proposal would first need to be approved by Peru’s Congress—either by an absolute majority of 87 votes in two consecutive legislative sessions, or by a simple majority of 66 votes followed by ratification through a national referendum. These procedural requirements are expected to change with the introduction of a bicameral Congress beginning in 2026. Social and political instability in Peru is not new. The country has experienced various instances of instability ranging from domestic terrorism (during the 1980s) to military coups and a succession of regimes. Although renewed domestic terrorism is not expected, any violence derived from the drug trade or illegal mining, or a resumption of large-scale terrorist activities, could hurt our operations. Additionally, some regimes during the 1970s and 1980s heavily intervened in the economy, through actions including expropriation, nationalization and new taxation policies. These interventions altered the country’s economic environment, financial system and agricultural sector, among other components. There have also been several political disputes between the government and the opposition in recent years. Since 2001, more than ten different political organizations have nominated candidates in each of the past five election processes, showing 15 Table of Contents low approval rating for all candidates (usually around 20%–30% or less). Between August 2016 and February 2026, Peru has had 8 presidents, 3 congresses and 20 prime ministers. Socioeconomic conditions Additionally, high levels of poverty and inequality in Peru have been a contributing factor to social conflict. According to Peruvian National Institute of Statistics and Information (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática or INEI by its Spanish initials), Peru’s poverty rate decreased from almost 60% of the population to 20% between 2004 and 2019 (that is, before the COVID-19 pandemic). In 2020, due to the economic shock resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, the poverty rate increased to 30%, erasing nearly all gains from the last decade and even though it fell to 25.9% in 2021, it rose again in 2022 to 27.5%, remaining above pre-pandemic levels. In 2023, the poverty rate increased for a second consecutive year to 29% due to the first economic recession in 25 years, excluding the pandemic. In 2024, as the economy began to recover, Peru’s poverty rate declined to 27.6%. The rate is expected to continue falling supported by stronger economic growth. There can be no assurance that Peru will not continue facing political, economic or social problems in the future or that these problems will not adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations. There is always the possibility that a political faction could promote policies to respond to social unrest that include, among other things, expropriation, nationalization, suspension of the enforcement of creditors’ rights and new taxation policies. As such, our financial condition and results of operations may be adversely affected by changes in Peru’s political climate to the extent such changes affect the nation’s economic policies, growth, stability, outlook or regulatory environment. Another source of risk is political and social unrest in areas where mining and oil and gas operations take place. In recent years, Peru has experienced protests against mining projects in several regions around the country. Mining is an important part of the Peruvian economy. According to INEI, the mining and hydrocarbons sector represented 14.4% of GDP (mining 12.2% and hydrocarbons 2.2%) in 2025, this corresponds to the weight derived from the GDP structure with base year 2007. The country’s exports are highly concentrated in the mining industry. In 2025, free on board (FOB) exports of metallic mining represented 66% of total exports (copper represents 45% while gold 38% of mining exports), with tax revenues from the sector representing close to 11% of total fiscal revenues. On several occasions, local communities have opposed these operations, and accused them of polluting the environment, specifically rivers, hurting agricultural and other traditional economic activities, as well as complained of not receiving the benefits generated by the mining projects. For example, in April 2022, Las Bambas (which produced 15% of Peru's total copper production in 2025) shut down for 51 days after protesters from two communities entered the mine. The social protests of late 2022 and early 2023 also affected Las Bambas’ operations, as road blockages prevented the arrival of key inputs. In another example, on January 12, 2023, Minsur announced the temporary suspension of operations in its San Rafael tin mine in Peru’s Puno region, as a measure of solidarity with the families of individuals who died in protests in the region. On February 6, 2023, Buenaventura temporarily suspended operations at its Julcani silver mine after protesters entered and destroyed part of the mine's facilities. In 2024, protests and strikes were held in Arequipa and Puno, regions of southern Peru, against the Tía María mining project, though these were less intense compared to those during the social crisis of late 2022. These protests were primarily driven by local communities concerned about the environmental impact and potential threats to their agricultural livelihoods. The Tía María project, operated by Southern Peru Copper Corporation, has been a point of contention for years. In July 2024, the company announced plans to resume development, which reignited opposition, although less than in the past. For instance, on December 16 and 17, farmers staged a preventive strike in the Tambo Valley, in Islay, Arequipa—right within the mining project’s area of influence. Notwithstanding this opposition, construction progress stood at approximately 24% as of December 2025. Any delay or cancellation of mining projects could reduce Peruvian economic growth and business confidence, through reduced production, thereby hurting the financial system both directly (many mining projects are at least partially financed by local financial institutions) and indirectly (overall economic activity could decelerate). Additionally, 66% of total exports are metallic mining products; fewer exports could reduce the trade balance surplus, cause depreciation pressures, and increase inflation. Any such effect on the financial system could have a material adverse effect on our business and result of operations. More recently, violence and crime have become the main concern of Peruvians, according to a October 2025 Ipsos survey—above corruption and unemployment. According to the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) and the Interinstitutional Statistical Committee on Criminality (CEIC), the homicide rate in Peru in 2025 was 10.7 per 100,000 inhabitants, a historical high (7.2 in 2015, according to the December 2024 research from the Bank of Ideas Credicorp). The increase in citizen insecurity not only has a negative impact on victims of crime, but also households and companies, which allocate part of their income to prevention measures. Due to the security crisis, the government declared two districts of 16 Table of Contents Metropolitan Lima in a state of emergency in September 2023 to provide for security and social peace until January 2024. In September 2024, a 60-day state of emergency was declared in 12 districts of Lima following a strike by bus drivers demanding greater protection from organized crime. At the beginning of January 2025, the government extended the state of emergency declared in the province of Trujillo in the department of La Libertad for 60 days due to a significant increase in criminal activity, including extortion, kidnappings, and murders. During 2025, the Peruvian government continued to rely on successive declarations and extensions of states of emergency in several regions, particularly in Metropolitan Lima, Callao and the province of Trujillo, with measures renewed multiple times during the year, adjusted in scope to specific districts or provinces, and periodically re‑declared in response to persistent criminal activity, including extortion, kidnappings and violent crime. These measures generally involved the temporary restriction of certain constitutional rights (freedom of assembly, and transit, among others) and the support of the Armed Forces to the National Police in maintaining public order, and similar actions could continue to be adopted in the future depending on security conditions. Mining has also been affected by crime. In December 2023, nine workers were killed and others gravely injured in an attack where men armed with explosives raided and took hostages at a mine belonging to Compañía Minera Poderosa, one of Peru's top gold producers. The government attributed the attack to illegal miners and criminal groups. In September 2024, a subsequent attack on a Poderosa facility resulted in the death of a security agent and injuries to others. On January 12, 2025, the company was again targeted by illegal miners and criminal groups, resulting in the destruction of a high-voltage tower that supplies power to key mining operations in Pataz, located in the department of La Libertad. In May 2025, following the kidnapping and subsequent murder of thirteen security workers linked to a contractor operating at a Poderosa‑related mine site in Pataz, the government temporarily suspended mining operations, imposed curfews and expanded the military presence in the area. The risk that such criminal acts could persist or recur in the future remains high. Altogether, this reduces economic efficiency and aggregate productivity. Higher crime rates can lead to financial instability for borrowers, making it more difficult for them to repay loans. Additionally, it can negatively impact the local economy, leading to reduced business activity and lower income levels. This economic downturn can affect borrowers’ ability to repay loans, which in turn increases the overall credit risk. Even further, crime can disrupt business operations, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which can lead to cash flow problems, making it harder for businesses to meet their loan obligations. The persistence of these problems represents a source of risk to the economy and Credicorp’s Businesses. After social unrest erupted in December 2022, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) changed the outlook for Peru’s long-term debt in foreign currency from stable to negative (but kept the credit rating at BBB) due to the challenging relationship between the executive and legislative branches, which limited the government’s ability to timely implement policies. S&P reaffirmed its BBB rating with negative outlook in February 2024 and two months later, in April 2024, it downgraded Peru's sovereign debt credit rating to BBB- (the lowest level allowed to be considered an investment-grade country) with a stable outlook. The agency indicated that its decision reflected the country's complex political environment, which limits the government's ability to adopt policies that favor investment and, in turn, affects growth prospects. In September 2024, Moody's affirmed Peru's credit rating at Baa1, two notches above the minimum investment grade rating, and improved the outlook from negative to stable due to political reforms that alleviate medium-term concerns about institutional stability. These reforms included the restoration of a bicameral Congress and the reintroduction of congressional reelection. In November 2024, Fitch also improved the outlook from negative to stable and affirmed its rating at BBB (one notch above the minimum investment grade rating). Since then, there have been no further changes to Peru’s sovereign credit ratings or outlooks. Peru held general elections on April 12, 2026, to elect a new President, members of Congress and the Senate under the restored bicameral legislative system. As no presidential candidate secured an absolute majority in the first round, a second‑round runoff election is scheduled for June 7, 2026. These elections mark the return to a bicameral Congress, including the election of a new Senate, which has constitutional and oversight powers, such as reviewing and approving legislation passed by the lower house, ratifying key public appointments, and authorizing certain executive actions. Peru’s electoral framework includes a legislative electoral threshold (“valla electoral”) that conditions access to congressional representation. Under the reinstated bicameral legislature, political organizations must obtain at least 5% of valid nationwide votes and meet minimum seat thresholds in each chamber to participate in the allocation of congressional seats. The implementation of this framework, together with the transition to a bicameral Congress, may contribute to political fragmentation, legislative delays, or shifts in economic or regulatory priorities. These factors could increase political 17 Table of Contents uncertainty and social tensions, potentially adversely affecting investor confidence, economic growth, and the operating environment for businesses in Peru. Our banking and capital market operations in neighboring countries expose us to risks related to political and economic conditions in those countries. ICBSA, Credicorp Capital Holding Colombia, Credicorp Capital Holding Chile and ASB Bank Corp. expose us to risks related to Bolivian, Colombian, Chilean and Panamanian political and economic conditions, respectively. These economies experienced significant GDP contractions in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and faced uneven recoveries as a result of different policy responses and economic structures. Even prior to the pandemic, these countries exhibited elevated levels of inequality and social dissatisfaction. The pandemic’s adverse effects on poverty and inequality were further exacerbated by the pandemic’s adverse effects on poverty and employment. The global inflationary shock (especially high energy and food prices) drove inflation rates to their highest in decades to which central banks reacted by significantly increasing their policy rates. This environment further intensified existing social and economic pressures in these markets which resulted in countries facing distinct macroeconomic trajectories shaped by idiosyncratic factors. Between 2019 and 2023, Chile experienced significant social and political turbulence. In October 2019, massive and violent demonstrations erupted, prompting President Sebastián Piñera’s government to agree to a referendum on a new constitution. In late 2021, Gabriel Boric, a 36‑year‑old left‑wing leader, was elected president for a four‑year term. After voters rejected the proposed new constitution in September 2022, Congress approved a new constitutional process, which was again rejected in December 2023. More recently, political developments have reduced uncertainty. In December 2025, José Antonio Kast was elected president by a decisive margin, marking a shift toward more conservative economic and public‑order policies. In Colombia, the proposal of an unpopular tax reform in 2021 triggered serious public unrest, ranking among the worst episodes of social protest in the country’s recent history. In 2022, Gustavo Petro, a left‑wing candidate and former member of the M‑19 guerrilla group, won the general election, becoming the first left‑wing president in Colombia’s history for a four‑year term. His ability to implement reforms has been undermined by corruption scandals and the subsequent loss of a political majority in Congress. Colombia will hold presidential elections in May 2026, with a possible runoff in June, a process that typically gains greater clarity after early‑year political developments. Recent polling suggests a highly competitive race between right‑ and left‑wing candidates, with the eventual outcome expected to significantly shape the macroeconomic outlook amid fiscal deterioration, weak private investment, and worsening security conditions. Panama experienced rising social unrest beginning in 2022, driven by increasing living costs. In October 2023, large‑scale protests erupted again after Congress fast‑tracked approval of the renegotiated concession contract between the government and Minera Cobre Panamá. The unrest lasted more than a month and ended only after the Supreme Court ruled the contract unconstitutional, a decision widely welcomed by the population. Following this period of instability, José Raúl Mulino was elected president in May 2024. His administration has taken steps to restore fiscal discipline and institutional stability, including securing the suspension of international arbitration proceedings involving Minera Cobre Panamá. In 2025, however, Mulino’s government faced renewed social unrest following approval of a reform to the social security system. Despite widespread protests, the administration did not retract the reform, underscoring its commitment to advancing structural fiscal measures amid continued social opposition. In Bolivia, Luis Arce, a left‑wing candidate, was elected president for a five‑year term in 2020. Between late 2022 and January 2023, protests took place in Santa Cruz, the country’s largest city by GDP. In September 2024, social unrest intensified following the disqualification of Evo Morales’s candidacy for the August 2025 election. Supporters of Morales, including factions within the MAS party, organized demonstrations and roadblocks, which escalated into violent clashes between pro‑Morales and pro‑Arce groups and were also driven by underlying economic concerns. Political uncertainty eased after the October 2025 election of President Rodrigo Paz, which ended nearly two decades of rule by the Movement Toward Socialism party and marked a significant political transition amid efforts to address macroeconomic imbalances and restore confidence. While these more recent electoral outcomes may contribute to greater political clarity or policy continuity in certain jurisdictions, the region remains exposed to risks associated with persistent social demands, political polarization and potential shifts in economic policy. Such risks could continue to affect macroeconomic conditions and the operating environment in the countries in which we operate. Accordingly, we cannot provide any assurance that Peru will not experience spillover effects from developments in neighboring or comparable countries, including situations observed elsewhere in the region where social dissatisfaction initially concentrated among lower‑income groups later extended to broader segments of the population, such as the middle class. A similar expansion of social unrest in Peru could adversely affect economic activity, consumer confidence 18 Table of Contents and segments of our client base, which could have a materially adverse effect on our business and results of operations. In addition, significant changes in political or economic conditions in Bolivia, Colombia, Chile or Panama could also adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations. Bolivia In 2025, the Bolivian economy continued to face significant challenges stemming from the balance of payments crisis that began in 2023. This situation was further exacerbated by domestic fuel shortages, increasing volatility in the parallel exchange rate, and low levels of dollar liquidity at the Central Bank, which affected its ability to meet key short-term obligations. In addition, sociopolitical polarization intensified. During the first half of the year, several social groups opposed to the government staged protests and road blockades that directly disrupted economic activity and exerted upward pressure on prices, with the highest monthly variation recorded in June (5.2%). GDP fell 1.6% year-on-year in the first nine months of 2025. As in 2024, the government maintained unconventional policies aimed at restoring foreign exchange flows and address macroeconomic imbalances. These measures included the domestic purchase of gold, the issuance of U.S. Dollar-denominated bonds, gold-backed forward operations, the repatriation of public company assets, and the receipt of transfers, donations, and other sources of income. As a result, the Central Bank acquired approximately US$2.7 billion to meet its financial obligations. Despite these efforts, the foreign currency shortage persisted. From the latter half of 2025 onward, Bolivia experienced a notable improvement in its economic outlook, supported by increased optimism following the inauguration of the new government in November. The economic measures implemented by the authorities yielded positive results across multiple indicators, including moderated inflation, stabilization of the parallel exchange rate, and a reduction in country risk (573 basis points as of February 20, 2026, from approximately 1,525 basis points prior to the first round of the presidential election). Key measures enacted included eliminating the fuel subsidy, negotiating new external loans with multilateral organizations totaling up to US$7.6 billion, publishing a reference exchange rate based on foreign trade transactions within the financial sector, tariff relief for various imported goods, and strengthening social compensation and benefit programs. By the end of 2025, Bolivia’s international reserves reached approximately US$3.7 billion, equivalent to 6.5% of GDP and representing an 88% increase compared to the end of 2024. Most reserves were held in gold, cash reserves increased from 2.4% to 13.6% of total reserves within the year. The exchange rate averaged 9.6 bolivianos per dollar by December, while the official exchange rate remained unchanged. Annual inflation rose to 20.4% in December 2025, primarily influenced by adverse weather conditions, political instability, smuggling activities, and global inflationary pressures. Additionally, the government established a six-month deferral on loans granted to micro and small economic units upon borrower request. Finally, the Financial System Supervisory Authority (ASFI) required banks to capitalize a smaller share of their profits compared to previous years, easing capital retention requirements. Colombia The Colombian economy grew 2.6% year-over-year in 2025. In line with our expectations and the dynamic seen over the last year, consumption remained the primary driver of economic activity, resulting in a strong increase in domestic demand (3Q25: 5%; YTD: 4.6%). On the private consumption side, the solid dynamism has been explained by i) higher real salaries, ii) a record-low unemployment rate amid higher job creation, iii) historic workers’ remittances, iv) government transfers to households, v) higher income of coffee-growing families, and vi) higher consumer credit. Public consumption has significantly contributed to GDP expansion amid ongoing fiscal deterioration and the government's reluctance to undertake spending cuts, especially during the electoral period. Conversely, investment remains sluggish, posing risks to potential GDP growth ahead. Elevated interest rates and heightened regulatory risks amid political uncertainty continue to weigh on investment. GDP is expected to grow 2.7% in 2026. Headline inflation remained relatively stable in 2025, standing at 5.10%, just 10bps below the 2024 close (5.2%), making fifth consecutive year above the inflation target range of 3.0% +/- 1 percentage point. This trend was primarily driven by the housing (rent,utilities and basic services) division (+4.76% y/y, contributing +148bp), foodstuffs (+5.07% y/y, +95bp), and 19 Table of Contents restaurants and hotels (+4.97% y/y, +87bp). Notably, core measures signaled mounting inflationary pressures at the end of last year, with the average of the four core metrics remaining high at 5.24% y/y (the BanRep’s preferred gauge, which excludes food and regulated items, accelerated to 5.02% y/y). Strong domestic demand and indexation mechanisms following minimum-wage increases have been major factors behind inflation's stickiness. The stunning 23% increase in the minimum wage in 2026 is expected to push inflation. Under this scenario, the Banco de la República (BanRep) only cut its reference rate by 25 basis points to 9.25% along 2025, in stark contrast to initial market forecasts of an accumulated 250 basis points reduction. In January 2026, the BanRep raised its policy rate by 100 bp to 10.25% citing rising inflation expectations following the increase in the 2026 minimum wage. The COP closed Dec-25 at 3,775 per dollar, representing a 14.3% y/y appreciation. This trend was driven by factors such as (i) the global weakening of the USD throughout the year and (ii) the externalities of the national government’s financial engineering maneuvers. Specifically, the Directorate of Public Credit executed strategic monetizations of proceeds from external debt issuances to bolster the local currency, leveraging the exchange rate to improve key fiscal metrics. All in all, according to the central bank’s technical staff, the current analytical framework for macroeconomic imbalances indicates that (a) fiscal slippage and (b) the overvaluation of the real exchange rate are the primary concerns. Total fiscal deficit closed last year near 6.2% of GDP; however, the primary deficit reached ~3% of GDP indicating that the structural deterioration of public finances persists. Under this context, Fitch cut the sovereign rating from BB+ to BB in December 25, matching S&P. All attention will be paid to the fiscal plan of the upcoming administration. On the political side, congressional elections primaries were held on March 8, 2026, while the first round of the presidential election is scheduled for May 31, 2026, with a potential runoff on June 21, 2026. The March elections provided greater visibility on the electoral landscape, narrowing the presidential field to approximately six candidates. Paloma Valencia (center‑right), Abelardo de la Espriella (right), and Iván Cepeda (hard left) have emerged as the most prominent figures. The new Congress is expected to remain highly fragmented, with no absolute majority, and the left is set to lose around 10 seats following the expiration of the special congressional seats granted under the FARC Peace Agreement. Undoubtedly, the final electoral outcome will shape the macroeconomic outlook over the coming years, against a backdrop of deteriorating fiscal accounts, sluggish private investment, and worsening security conditions. Chile According to the Central Bank of Chile (BCCh), Chile’s annual GDP grew by 2.4% in 2025. Growth projections were steadily raised throughout the year—particularly for non-mining sectors—as the global economy remained resilient and local investment proved more dynamic than anticipated, especially in the mining and energy industries. Investment exceeded expectations, with capital goods import figures confirming this positive momentum; however, investment in construction and infrastructure continues to lag. Private consumption evolved in line with forecasts as its underlying fundamentals improved. Specifically, consumer confidence has risen, and the labor market shows signs of recovery, although significant challenges remain. The BCCh also noted improved terms of trade, driven by a sharp rise in copper prices. This surge is attributed to increased demand—linked to artificial intelligence (AI) investment, the energy transition, and defense spending—combined with supply constraints. Conversely, oil prices declined due to improved supply prospects. According to the Chilean National Statistics Bureau (INE), annual inflation stood at 3.5% in December 2025, down from 4.5% a year earlier and slightly above the Central Bank’s 3% target. During the year, inflation declined faster than anticipated, particularly in the goods component, driven by the strong appreciation of the Chilean Peso (CLP) and the impact of trade diversions on the prices of certain imported goods. Services inflation remained above 4% by year-end, although labor cost growth slowed. According to BCCh surveys, two-year inflation expectations remain well-anchored at the 3% target. In this context, the BCCh continued the normalization of the policy rate, implementing a total reduction of 50 basis points during 2025, for a cumulative decrease of 675 basis points since July 2023. The rate closed the year at 4.5%, near the midpoint of the neutral level estimated at 4.25%. Looking ahead, the BCCh stated that the Board will evaluate future movements of the monetary policy rate based on the evolution of the macroeconomic scenario and its implications for inflation convergence. Regarding the fiscal accounts, the fiscal deficit close 2025 at 2.8% of GDP, while gross debt remained stable at 41.7% of GDP in 2025. The recent surge in copper prices is likely to alleviate fiscal pressures in the short term. Notably, both S&P and Moody’s reaffirmed Chile’s sovereign credit rating with a stable outlook. S&P highlighted Chile’s strong institutional framework, sound fiscal and monetary policies, and moderate debt profile by international standards, noting that foreign direct 20 Table of Contents investment is sufficient to finance current-account deficits. Moody’s emphasized that Chile’s fiscal consolidation is expected to continue, keeping debt well below its prudent threshold of 45% of GDP. Finally, on the political front, José Antonio Kast (right-wing) was elected the new President of Chile. The election results coincided with rising consumer and business confidence, declining political uncertainty, upward revisions to GDP growth estimates to 2.4%, and a historic rise in the IPSA index. However, the elections produced a fragmented Congress with no coalition securing an absolute majority in either chamber, increasing the likelihood that the next administration will likely need to negotiate across multiple blocs to advance legislation, which could complicate or delay the legislative process. Panama In 2025, GDP grew 4.4% year-over-year, rebounding from a weak performance in 2024, when growth slowed to 2.7%—its lowest rate since the 2009 global financial crisis, excluding the pandemic period. The recovery was primarily driven by private consumption and services activity, despite periods of social unrest between April and July 2025 and continued uncertainty related to fiscal and social security reforms. In 2024, economic activity was adversely affected by the closure of the Cobre Panamá mine, the loss of investment grade status by Fitch Ratings, and heightened uncertainty surrounding the May 2024 presidential elections. In 2023, GDP grew by 7.2%, supported by significant infrastructure and investment projects, including Panama’s third metro line and a fourth bridge over the Panama Canal. In 2023, the “El Niño” phenomenon caused the most severe drought in approximately 70 years, disrupting operations at the Panama Canal. As a result, the number of vessels transiting the Canal declined by 7.4% compared to the previous year, although toll revenues increased by approximately 10%, representing around 4% of GDP. The logistics sector accounts for approximately 11.6% of Panama’s GDP, and the country is recognized as a regional logistics and financial hub. According to McKinsey, an estimated 2.5% of global seaborne trade transits through the Panama Canal. Prolonged or renewed restrictions on Canal transit volumes could force vessels to divert to alternative routes, resulting in longer transit times and higher transportation costs. The post‑pandemic recovery in 2021 and 2022 was particularly strong, with Panama ranking among the highest global growth performers following the unprecedented 17.8% contraction in GDP in 2020. GDP expanded by 16.5% in 2021 and 11.0% in 2022, supported by the global economic recovery, large‑scale infrastructure projects, and copper production from the Cobre Panamá mine. One important development in 2025 was the approval of the social security reform intended to strengthen the long-term sustainability of the pension system and mitigate pressures on public finances. In March 2025, Panama enacted Law No. 462, which introduced significant reforms to the Social Security Fund (Caja de Seguro Social, or “CSS”) and its Disability, Old Age and Death program (“IVM”). Panama has experienced several episodes of social unrest in recent years. In mid‑2022, protests erupted in response to rising living costs—particularly higher fuel prices—as well as concerns over inequality and perceived corruption. In October 2023, Congress fast‑tracked the approval of a renegotiated concession contract between the government and Minera Panamá, a local subsidiary of First Quantum Minerals, triggering widespread protests and road blockages—the most severe in at least three decades—which disrupted economic activity and led to shortages of basic goods. Protesters argued that the contract was unconstitutional, abusive, and environmentally harmful. More recently, the 2025 social security reform also triggered protests, reflecting long‑standing concerns over the sustainability and governance of the social security system, fears of potential future pension benefit erosion, and public distrust stemming from prior pension reforms. In November 2023, former President Laurentino Cortizo enacted an indefinite moratorium on new mining concessions and prohibited the renewal of existing ones in an effort to reduce social unrest. Despite this measure, protests continued, and days later Panama’s Supreme Court ruled the concession contract unconstitutional, a decision that was broadly welcomed by the population. As a result, the government ordered the definitive closure of First Quantum Minerals’ copper mine. According to the Minister of Industry and Commerce, the orderly closure of a mine of this scale could take between seven to eight years. First Quantum subsequently initiated two arbitration proceedings against Panama, seeking at least US$20 billion (approximately 23% of 2024 GDP), one before the International Chamber of Commerce and another under the Canada–Panama Free Trade Agreement. However, in March 2025, First Quantum announced that it had agreed with the government to discontinue both arbitration proceedings. In June 2025, the company resumed the export of stockpiled copper concentrate following government approval granted in May 2025, which authorized the export of up to 120,000 tonnes of stranded material. 21 Table of Contents Proceeds from these sales are intended to support the ongoing maintenance of the idled facility. The likelihood of a reopening of the mine remains uncertain. The significance of the mine to the country was undeniable. Cobre Panamá was the largest private investment project in the nation’s history, amounting to 10% of GDP in 2024. It began operations in 2019 and reached maximum capacity in 2021. With a production of 350,000 tons of copper in 2022, it ranked among the top 15 copper-producing mines globally. Additionally, according to the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC), it generated around US$2.8 billion (3.1% of 2025 GDP) through copper exports and was an important source of fiscal revenue. In an already challenging fiscal environment, the closure of the Cobre Panama mine and the moratorium on new mining concessions triggered movements from the three main credit rating agencies in 2024. No further changes were made in 2025. In March 2024, Fitch downgraded Panama’s credit rating by one notch to BB+ with a stable outlook, stripping the country of its investment grade status achieved in 2010. The agency stated that the move reflected fiscal and governance challenges aggravated by the events surrounding the closure of Minera Cobre Panama in 2023. Later, in December 2024, the agency affirmed its BB+ rating with a stable outlook. Panama’s public debt, as a percentage of GDP, peaked at year-end 2020 at 64.8% of GDP, declined to 60.1% at year-end 2021, 58.0% of GDP at year-end 2022, and 56.4% of GDP at year-end 2023, before increasing to 62.3% of GDP at the end of 2024 and to 65.5% at year-end 2025. In October 2024, Moody’s reaffirmed its rating at Baa3 but changed the outlook to negative. The agency stated that this decision reflected a greater-than-expected deterioration of the fiscal balance in 2024 and significant obstacles to achieving rapid fiscal consolidation, suggesting risks that sovereign debt indicators and debt affordability will weaken. In November 2024, S&P downgraded Panama's rating to BBB- and changed the outlook to stable due to the weakening of Panama's fiscal flexibility and performance, attributed to a higher interest burden that increased its vulnerability to adverse economic conditions. As such, Moody’s and S&P places Panama’s credit rating at the lowest possible rating for a security to be considered investment grade. On the political front, Jose Raul Mulino, from the Realizando Metas party of former president Ricardo Martinelli, won the May 2024 presidential elections with 34% of the votes. He defeated Ricardo Lombana who finished second with 25% of the votes. His presidential mandate runs until 2029. According to S&P, Mulino's administration, which took office on July 1, inherited several pressing challenges, including a rising social security deficit, weak public finances, and the fallout the closure of the copper mine in 2023. Addressing these challenges will require negotiations with other political parties, as the president's party lacks a simple majority. In 2025, the stance of President Trump towards the Panama Canal has proven to be another challenge faced by Mulino’s government. President Trump threatened to take control of the Panama Canal, citing concerns over China's growing influence in the region. In response, Panama agreed to end its Belt and Road agreement with China and increase cooperation with the U.S. to reduce Chinese influence. The agreement with China included projects such as the expansion of ports, construction of railways, and other significant infrastructure developments. The Panamanian government also initiated an audit process for Panama Ports Company, a subsidiary of the Chinese company Hutchison Ports, which manages two ports of the Canal. In January 2026, Panama’s Supreme Court ruled that the concession held by CK Hutchison to operate the ports of Balboa and Cristóbal was unconstitutional, prompting a strong reaction from the Chinese government, which criticized the decision and warned that Panama could face political and economic consequences. President José Raúl Mulino publicly rejected those warnings, underscoring the geopolitical sensitivity of the dispute. Panama was removed from the (Financial Action Task Force) grey list, in October 2023, a development viewed by the International Monetary Fund as key to preserving Panama’s position as a regional financial center. Additionally, in July 2025, it was removed from the European Union list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes. Finally, downside pressures on economic activity and risks to trade through the Panamá Canal could negatively impact on lending activity and credit quality of loan portfolios at BCP Panamá. Economic and market conditions in other countries may affect the Peruvian economy and the market price of Peruvian securities. Peru is a small, open economy highly integrated with the rest of the world and affected by movements in the external environment (including the growth of main trade partners, changes in commodity prices and movements in external rates and global financial markets). As such, any major deterioration of the international economy can have materially adverse effects on the Peruvian economy and markets, as well as in our businesses and operational results. 22 Table of Contents U.S. President Trump's presidency has materially impacted various aspects of global politics, economics, and international relations. President Trump, a Republican, began his second nonconsecutive term on January 20, 2025. His party achieved a majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, which gave Republicans the opportunity to control the legislative agenda and made it easier for President Trump to pass laws and implement his policies. Since January 2025, the Trump administration has implemented significant policy changes in the United States, particularly in trade, immigration, fiscal policy and monetary policy, which has increased uncertainty in global economic and financial conditions. The expansion of tariffs as a core trade‑policy instrument—including a universal baseline tariff and reciprocal measures—has raised the U.S. effective tariff rate and contributed to slower‑than‑expected disinflation through retail price pass‑through, while also increasing the risk of supply‑chain disruptions, weaker investment and renewed market volatility should trade tensions escalate. With respect to Peru, Chile, and Colombia, these countries were subject to a 10% reciprocal tariff; however, such tariffs were invalidated following the U.S. Supreme Court’s February 20, 2026 ruling that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the imposition of tariffs. In response, the Trump administration announced the imposition of a global tariff under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, initially set at 10% and subsequently increased to 15%—the statutory maximum—for a period of up to 150 days, subject to congressional approval for any extension beyond that timeframe. In parallel, more restrictive immigration policies have reduced growth in the U.S. labor force, increasing the risk that a future acceleration in labor demand could place upward pressure on wages and inflation. Expansionary fiscal measures, including tax cuts, may support near‑term growth but could exacerbate fiscal imbalances and place upward pressure on long term interest rates, tightening financial conditions. Uncertainty has also increased regarding U.S. monetary policy, amid public criticism of the Federal Reserve by President Trump and concerns about potential erosion of central‑bank independence. Any re‑acceleration of inflation could prompt the Federal Reserve to maintain a restrictive stance for longer, leading markets to reassess expectations for currently pricing in rate cuts. A shift toward fewer cuts or renewed tightening could strengthen the U.S. Dollar, increase global risk premia, and tighten financial conditions, with adverse spillovers to emerging markets, including Peru. The risk of renewed inflationary pressures from the aforementioned policies could prompt central banks, particularly the Federal Reserve of the United States, to halt the rate-cutting cycle, keeping the policy rate at levels slightly above neutral (3.75% upper bound as of January 2026). A change in market‑implied interest rate expectations, from one rate cut currently priced to a scenario involving no cuts or possible rate increases, could exacerbate fiscal, financial, and external risks, while also strengthening the US Dollar. The weakening of global economic growth could affect Peru’s economic growth mainly through lower commodity prices and lower external demand. The country’s exports are highly concentrated in the mining industry, where copper and gold exports’ share of total exports was above to 50% in 2025. In addition, an important source of fiscal revenue comes from mining (10.6% in 2025). Therefore, Peruvian trade responds significantly to fluctuations in metal prices, especially copper and gold. In 2025, Peru’s trade surplus increased to a record of US$34.6 billion, due to a 21.8% growth in exports, an increase of 12.3% in imports and terms of trade at historical highs. The average copper price for 2025 was US$4.51 per pound, 9% higher than the average of US$4.15 per pound in 2024, while oil prices fell 15% over the same period (to US$64.7 per barrel). In addition to changes in prices, Peru is also vulnerable to fluctuations in foreign demand, particularly from its main trading partners, China and the United States, which account for 35% and 12% of its total exports, respectively. The European Union is also an important buyer of Peruvian goods, especially non-traditional ones (13% of total exports and 24% of total non-traditional exports). As such, lower than expected growth from these countries would pose risks to Peru’s exports, foreign direct investments, and overall economic growth. If inflation were to reaccelerate, the Federal Reserve could be compelled to maintain a restrictive monetary policy stance for a longer period. This could reinforce U.S. Dollar appreciation pressures, which, in turn, could lead to depreciation pressures on the Peruvian currency. If such depreciation pressures were large or persistent, they could complicate the Central Reserve Bank of Peru’s efforts to keep inflation within its target range of 1% to 3%. A weaker currency would raise the cost of imported goods and could contribute to higher domestic inflationary pressures. President Trump’s concerns regarding China’s involvement in Latin America underscore broader geopolitical risks that may also be relevant for Peru. The Trump administration’s confrontational stance toward China, combined with Peru’s deep economic ties with China, could give rise to downside risks depending on future U.S. policy responses. For example, the Chancay Port—expected to transform Peru into a major logistics hub on the Pacific coast of South America—is operated by Cosco Shipping Ports Chancay Perú S.A., a joint venture between the Chinese state‑owned company COSCO Shipping Ports (60%) and the Peruvian company Volcan (40%). In addition, Chinese companies control a substantial share of electricity distribution in Lima. According to the Peruvian government, foreign direct investment from China in the mining sector totaled approximately US$15 billion between 2010 and 2024 following the entry into force of the bilateral free trade agreement. Additionally, copper production by Chinese‑owned companies accounted for approximately 25% of Peru’s total copper output in 2025. 23 Table of Contents In January 2026, the United States designated Peru as a Major Non‑NATO Ally, reinforcing bilateral cooperation in defense, security, and technology, while not conferring NATO membership or establishing automatic defense obligations. Any escalation in U.S.–China tensions or adverse policy measures affecting Chinese investments in the region could negatively affect economic activity, investor confidence and the operating environment in Peru and the countries where we operate, which could, in turn, adversely effect Credicorp’s business, financial condition and results of operations. In general, lower economic growth, rising inflation, and depreciation pressures can impact Credicorp's business. These factors may lead to reduced credit demand, an increase in non-performing loans, and slower growth in savings. For further detail please refer to “ITEM 5. OPERATING AND FINANCIAL REVIEW AND PROSPECTS – 5.A Operating Results – (2) Political and Macroeconomic Environment.” Likewise, a reduction of growth in Latin America can also impact the Peruvian economy and our business, especially regarding Chile, Colombia, Bolivia and Panama, where we have operations, as well as Brazil and Mexico, which have a broad impact throughout the region because of their size. Furthermore, financial conditions in global markets impact the Peruvian economy, affecting interest rates for local corporate bonds and influencing the exchange rate. Monetary policy tightening in developed economies, particularly by the Federal Reserve in the United States, could adversely affect economic activity in Peru because it strengthens the US Dollar and increases interest rates, thereby reducing access to funding for some local businesses. Also, because the Peruvian economy has a portion of loans denominated in US Dollars (21.9% of loans to the private sector and 31.4% of deposits as of December 2025), which is referred to as financial dollarization, balance sheet position effects should be considered because a higher exchange rate could increase debt burdens for individuals and businesses that have taken loans in Dollars but earn their income in local currency. Geopolitical tensions and conflict, including the conflicts between Russia and Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, could have economic effects that could negatively impact the Peruvian economy. We are exposed to geopolitical risks, including economic sanctions, acts or threats of international or domestic terrorism, actions taken by governments in response, state-sponsored cyberattacks or campaigns, and civil unrest and/or military conflicts, which could adversely affect business and economic conditions abroad and in the markets in which we operate. Tensions between the United States and Iran have increased materially, particularly in connection with Iran’s nuclear program, U.S. sanctions enforcement, and periodic military incidents in the Middle East, and, in late February 2026, escalated into open hostilities involving the United States, Israel and Iran, which has significantly raised geopolitical risk, global financial‑market volatility, and the risk of severe energy supply disruptions. Recent U.S.‑Israeli strikes against Iran and Iran’s subsequent retaliation targeting U.S. military assets and regional energy infrastructure have intensified concerns of a prolonged regional conflict, amid indications of renewed diplomatic strains during late 2025 and early 2026, and leadership dynamics in Tehran perceived as favoring a hardline continuation of hostilities.In early April 2026, the U.S. administration announced a temporary pause in active military operations to allow for diplomatic engagement, easing immediate escalation risks. However, U.S. authorities have emphasized that the pause remains conditional and reversible, with military options still on the table should negotiations fail or hostilities resume. Energy markets have reacted sharply, with oil and gas prices experiencing extreme volatility (year‑to‑date as of April 16, the price of WTI crude oil has increased by 64.9% and European natural gas prices have risen by 88.9%), reflecting production outages, infrastructure damage, temporary shutdowns of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facilities, storage constraints, and heightened fears of interference with maritime traffic or a sustained closure of the Strait of Hormuz—through which approximately 20% of global oil supplies transit. Given Iran’s role as an oil producer and the strategic importance of regional shipping routes, any further escalation of hostilities, disruption to Iranian output, or interference with maritime traffic could materially reduce supply and/or raise risk premiums, resulting in higher global energy prices. These developments have also contributed to significant volatility across commodities, foreign exchange, interest rates, and equity markets, with the U.S. Dollar appreciating, global equity markets reacting unevenly, and bond yields rising. Market sensitivity to energy‑driven inflation shocks remains elevated following the surge in global inflation associated with the Russia‑Ukraine war, increasing the risk that a renewed and persistent increase in energy prices could again feed through to broader price pressures. Elevated energy prices and sustained uncertainty could therefore exacerbate inflation, weigh on global growth—particularly in energy‑importing economies—and constrain monetary policy flexibility, including delaying or limiting anticipated interest rate cuts in the United States. Any further escalation, extended supply disruptions, sanctions‑related 24 Table of Contents constraints, policy actions affecting energy markets, or deterioration in broader regional stability could materially and adversely impact global economic conditions and financial markets, with adverse effects on the countries in which we operate and on our business, financial condition and results of operations. Furthermore, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine remains unresolved, with Russia’s invasion now in its fourth year, and the conflict continues to pose significant global risks in 2026. In 2025, sanctions and trade measures against Russia expanded further, with the United States announcing additional restrictions on Russia’s major energy companies and related entities, adding to earlier and broader sanctions that contributed to higher energy prices. In parallel, the European Union has maintained price caps on Russian petroleum products since late 2022 and has adopted additional measures to restrict the re‑exportation of certain goods to Russia. More recently, in February 2026, the United States reached a trade agreement with India that included commitments to reduce Indian purchases of Russian oil. These actions add to an already extensive and unprecedented sanctions regime. Any escalation of the conflict could intensify existing economic disruptions, particularly in energy markets, with adverse effects on global growth, inflation and financial stability. A scenario where geopolitical conflicts escalate and energy and commodity prices increase significantly would cause a negative shock on real disposable income and could make both basic and agricultural products more expensive, along with higher transportation costs due to higher oil prices. Emerging economies with high levels of poverty remain particularly vulnerable to this shock which could fuel new waves of social unrest. Additionally, it could renew inflationary pressures globally and cause central banks to keep policy rates around neutral for a prolonged period or even move towards a restrictive policy stance. The Israel–Hamas armed conflict that erupted in October 2023 escalated into a severe humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and triggered widespread global calls for a ceasefire. In January 2025, Israel and Hamas reached a U.S.‑, Egyptian‑ and Qatari‑mediated, multi‑phase ceasefire agreement, which came into effect on January 19, 2025, and provided for a cessation of hostilities, the release of hostages and prisoners, and expanded humanitarian access. A broader U.S.‑brokered ceasefire was subsequently reached in October 2025, including further troop withdrawals and the initiation of discussions on Gaza’s reconstruction, which is expected to take several years. However, both Israel and Hamas have accused each other of near‑daily violations since the ceasefire took effect, raising uncertainty about its durability. Any renewed escalation of the conflict could further exacerbate an already fragile regional security environment, particularly amid the ongoing U.S.‑Israel–Iran confrontation, which has disrupted energy transit routes and production across major oil‑ and gas‑exporting countries in the Middle East. A deterioration in conditions could compound risks to global energy supply, push energy prices higher, reignite inflationary pressures, and increase financial market volatility. Another geopolitical risk that has gained prominence following President Trump’s return to office is the deterioration in relations between the United States and China. In early 2025, the Trump administration imposed new tariffs on a broad range of Chinese imports, prompting retaliatory measures by the Chinese government and reigniting trade tensions between the two countries. Among major U.S. trading partners, China has been subject to the highest tariff burden. These developments represent a renewed escalation following the trade dispute during President Trump’s first term in 2018–2019, which involved repeated rounds of tariffs, allegations of currency manipulation and trade‑related actions at the World Trade Organization, and which weighed on global demand, commodity prices and financial market sentiment. The renewed U.S.–China trade conflict has increased uncertainty around global trade flows, supply chains and investment decisions and could adversely affect global economic growth and commodity markets, with potential spillover effects on emerging economies, including Peru. Although global growth exceeded expectations in 2025 and metal prices increased, this dynamic remains a significant risk to the global economy. The rerouting of Chinese exports has emerged as a relevant global trade issue in 2025, following higher tariffs imposed by the United States. In this context, Chinese products have increasingly entered other economies at lower prices, intensifying competition with local producers and exerting downward pressure on prices and margins in affected industries. Reflecting this trend, the number of antidumping measures applied to China and notified to the World Trade Organization increased significantly, rising from seven measures in the second quarter of 2024 to 31 measures in the same quarter of 2025. In Peru, the increased presence of lower‑priced Chinese imports has adversely affected specific domestic sectors, including detergent manufacturing, footwear and ceramic tiles production. Continued trade diversion, additional antidumping actions or sustained price‑based competition from imports could negatively impact other exposed sectors, which could adversely affect economic conditions and certain segments of our client base and, in turn, our business, financial condition and results of operations. In 2023, political tensions escalated after the United States shot down a suspected Chinese surveillance balloon, and U.S. Representative Nancy Pelosi, the former Speaker of the House, visited Taiwan, which China claims as part of its territory. In 2024, China intensified patrols around a group of islands controlled by Taiwan. More recently, on February 4, 2026, the South 25 Table of Contents China Morning Post reported that, during a telephone conversation between the two leaders, Chinese President Xi Jinping told U.S. President Donald Trump that the Taiwan issue represents the most important and sensitive matter in U.S.–China relations. President Xi reportedly urged President Trump to exercise extreme caution with respect to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Taiwan plays a critical role in the global electronics market, as the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is one of the world’s leading producers of semiconductors. An escalation of tensions between China and Taiwan could disrupt semiconductor supply chains and renew price pressures in the semiconductor market, with adverse effects on inflation similar to those observed in 2022. In January 2026, the United States and Taiwan announced a trade and investment agreement under which the U.S. reciprocal tariff rate on Taiwanese goods would be capped at approximately 15%, down from 20%, in exchange for increased Taiwanese investment in semiconductor manufacturing capacity in the United States. However, broader trade and geopolitical risks affecting the sector remain. If geopolitical risks lead to a stagflation (characterized by lower economic growth and rising inflation) Credicorp’s business could be impacted through reduced credit demand and increased customer credit risk leading to higher non-performing loans, and slower growth in savings. 26 Table of Contents Legal and Regulatory Risks Regulatory changes and the adoption of new international guidelines to sectors in which we operate could adversely affect our earnings and our operating performance. Because we are subject to regulation and supervision in Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Cayman Islands, the United States of America, Panama, and Bermuda, changes to the regulatory framework in any of these countries or changes in tax laws could adversely affect our business. Financial Services Activities We are directly subject to extensive supervision and regulation through the Peruvian Banking and Insurance Law and the Peruvian Consolidated Supervision of Financial and Mixed Conglomerates Regulation. The SBS and the BCRP supervise and regulate BCP Stand-alone and Mibanco’s operations. Peru’s constitution and the SBS’s statutory charter grant the SBS the authority to oversee and control banks and other financial institutions, including private pension funds and insurance companies. The SBS and the BCRP have general administrative responsibilities over BCP Stand-alone and Mibanco, including setting capital and reserve requirements. In past years, the BCRP has, on numerous occasions, changed the deposit reserve requirements applicable to Peruvian commercial banks, as well as the rate of interest paid on deposit reserves and the amount of deposit reserves on which no interest is payable by the BCRP. Such changes in the supervision and regulation of BCP Stand-alone and Mibanco may adversely affect our results of operations and financial condition. See “ITEM 4. INFORMATION ON THE COMPANY – 4.B Business Overview – (6) Supervision and Regulation – 6.2 Subsidiaries – 6.2.1 Peru” for additional information regarding the regulation of BCP Stand-alone and Mibanco by the SBS and the BCRP. Furthermore, changes in regulations related to consumer protection may also affect our business. For example, in March 2021, a new interest rate ceiling law was approved under the Peruvian Usury Law. This law grants the BCRP the power to set maximum and minimum interest rates, on a semi-annual basis, to regulate the market for consumer loans, small consumer loans, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) loans and credit card loans. Additionally, the Peruvian Usury Law states that if a debtor is late in payment, only default interest will be charged. The collection of penalties or other commissions or expenses from debtors, as well as the capitalization of interest, is prohibited. The Peruvian Usury Law also establishes that (i) the commissions and expenses applicable to consumer loans, small consumer loans, small and medium enterprises loans and credit card loans must imply the provision of an additional and/or complementary service to the transaction entered into by the clients; (ii) the financial institution must justify the transfer of the cost to the client; and (iii) the value of the service must be supported by a technical, economic and legal report, which must be submitted to the SBS. Even though the impact of the Peruvian Usury Law may be limited for Credicorp’s total loan book, it may impair our ability to financially include unbanked customers with riskier profiles. The Superintendence of the Securities Market of Peru (Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores or SMV by its Spanish initials) also supervises certain of our subsidiaries, such as BCP Consolidated, Credicorp Capital Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A. (Credicorp Capital SAB), Credicorp Capital S.A. Sociedad Administradora de Fondos (Credicorp Capital SAF), Credicorp Capital Peru S.A.A. (Credicorp Capital Peru) and Credicorp Capital Sociedad Titulizadora S.A. (Credicorp Capital Titulizadora). Additionally, some of our subsidiaries are under the supervision of the Peruvian Financial Intelligence Unit (Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera del Peru or UIF-Peru by its Spanish initials), and all of our subsidiaries that operate in Peru must comply with the provisions regulated by the Peruvian Consumer Protection Authority (Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual or INDECOPI by its Spanish initials) and the Peruvian Data Privacy Authority (Autoridad Nacional de Protección de Datos Personales or ANPDP by its Spanish initials). On the other hand, the Peruvian government has approved the Artificial Intelligence Regulation, which is overseen by the Secretariat of Digital Government under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The Artificial Intelligence Regulation entered into effect on January 23, 2026, with certain provisions scheduled to become effective on September 10, 2026. The regulation is being implemented as of today, and Credicorp has adopted the risk‑management, compliance, and governance measures to support adherence to this evolving regulatory framework. We are also regulated by other governmental entities in other jurisdictions. In Colombia, we are subject to supervision and regulation through the Unit of Financial Regulation (Unidad de Proyección Normativa y Estudios de Regulación Financiera or URF by its Spanish initials), the Financial Superintendence of Colombia (Superintendencia 27 Table of Contents Financiera de Colombia or SFC by its Spanish initials) and the Colombian Stock Market Self Regulator (Autorregulador del Mercado de Valores de Colombia or AMV by its Spanish initials). In Chile, we are subject to supervision and regulation through the Financial Markets Commission of Chile (Comisión para el Mercado Financiero or CMF by its Spanish initials). See “ITEM 4. INFORMATION ON THE COMPANY – 4.B Business Overview – (6) Supervision and Regulation – 6.2 Subsidiaries – 6.2.4. Colombia and 6.2.5 Chile”. In Bolivia, we are subject to the supervision of the Bolivian Financial Authority (Autoridad de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero or ASFI by its Spanish initials) and of the Bolivian Pensions and Insurance Authority (Autoridad de Fiscalización y Control de Pensiones y Seguros or APS by its Spanish initials). BCP Miami is regulated, supervised and examined by the Florida Office of Financial Regulation (OFR) and by the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System (FED). Our direct and indirect nonbanking subsidiaries doing business in the United States are also subject to the authority of relevant U.S. financial regulatory agencies depending on their U.S. activities. Further, Credicorp Capital LLC., our U.S. broker-dealer, is regulated, supervised and examined by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA). Additionally, Credicorp Capital Advisors LLC., our U.S. Registered Investment Adviser (RIA), is also regulated by the SEC. In the Cayman Islands, we are subject to the regulation of the Cayman Islands Companies Law for ASHC. Effective August 2, 2021, Atlantic Security Bank (Cayman Islands) and ASB Bank Corp. (Panama) merged, with the latter being the surviving entity. ASB Bank Corp. is supervised by its principal regulators, the Superintendence of Banks of Panama (Superintendencia de Bancos de Panama or SBP by its Spanish initials) and, with respect to activities relating to its securities investment business, the Superintendency of the Securities Market of the Republic of Panama (Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores de la República de Panama or Panama SMV by its Spanish initials). Changes in the supervision and regulation of our subsidiaries in other countries may adversely affect our results of operations and financial condition. For details on income tax review by the tax authorities on the jurisdictions in which we operate, please refer to Note 17(a) and (e) of the consolidated financial statements. Also, for further information refer to “ITEM 4. INFORMATION ON THE COMPANY – 4.B Business Overview – (6) Supervision and Regulation – 6.2 Subsidiaries”. Insurance Our Property and Casualty (P&C) and life insurance businesses are carried out by Pacífico Seguros, which is part of Grupo Pacífico. The insurance business is subject to regulation by the SBS. New legislation or regulations may adversely affect Grupo Pacífico’s ability to underwrite and price risks accurately, which in turn would affect Insurance Underwriting Results and business profitability. Grupo Pacífico is unable to predict whether and to what extent new laws and regulations that may affect its business will be adopted in the future. While Grupo Pacífico is unable to predict with any certainty the timing of the passage or adoption of any new laws or regulations, or the effects those laws or regulations may have on its operations, profitability and financial condition in future years, we expect Peru to adopt new legislation in the coming years that will change the regulation of insurance companies. The legislation may be similar to the measure enacted by the European Union through Solvency II, a regulatory capital framework that seeks to further reduce the insolvency risk faced by insurance companies in the European Union by improving capital regulations for insurance companies in the region. The Peruvian regulator has been working on the implementation of the risk-based capital model, which seeks to guarantee that insurance companies maintain the necessary capital to face the risks inherent to their activity in the face of possible stress scenarios (similar to Solvency II). It is expected that this model will come into force before the year 2028. In the first quantitative exercise that was carried out, the results for the company showed that Pacífico Seguros had capital in excess of what would be required. Medical Services The Group’s medical facilities are subject to extensive healthcare regulations and licensing requirements in Peru, including authorizations to operate as healthcare providers and ongoing supervision by relevant health authorities. Failure 28 Table of Contents to obtain, maintain or renew required licenses or to comply with applicable healthcare regulations could result in fines, sanctions, suspension of operations or revocation of operating authorizations. Changes in healthcare laws, regulations or enforcement practices may increase compliance costs or materially affect the Group’s medical services operations. Pension fund In recent years, the Peruvian government has implemented various reforms to the pension system, significantly impacting the funds under management and, consequently, our business operations and results. In January 2023, the government approved and published Law No. 31670, introducing a new retirement option based on a minimum pension and creating incentives to increase voluntary contributions. In June 2023, the SBS modified the methodology to calculate the legal reserve requirement. The new methodology assigns a fixed percentage (based on the level of risk of each fund) of the assets under management of each fund as the legal reserve requirement. In April 2024, Congress approved the seventh AFP withdrawal, allowing affiliates to withdraw up to 4 Tax Units (UIT), equivalent to S/20,600. The payments were made in four installments of up to 1 UIT each. According to figures from the SBS, approximately S/28 billion was withdrawn. For Prima, the total amount withdrawn reached S/7.8 billion. In September 2024, the government published a Law for the Modernization of the Peruvian Pension System, which provides for the creation of a Comprehensive Peruvian Pension System (SIPP) to ensure pension protection for all citizens. The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) had until June 18, 2025, to issue the regulations. This regulation was approved in September 2025 through Supreme Decree No. 189-2025-EF, which initiates the operational implementation of the new pension system. This regulatory framework developed key provisions by promoting increased competition in the sector and enabling the participation of banks, insurance companies, and other financial system entities under transparency requirements and equal operating conditions. While these measures represent initial steps toward a more robust and modern pension system, additional regulations remain pending with respect to material aspects such as the minimum and proportional pension schemes and the consumption-based pension, which are necessary for the full implementation of the new framework and broader pension coverage. In September 2025, Congress also approved the eighth AFP withdrawal, allowing affiliates to withdraw up to four Tax Units (UIT), equivalent to S/21,400. The withdrawals were made in four installments of up to one UIT each. The SBS has not yet published final figures; however, the total amount withdrawn has been estimated at approximately S/26 billion. As of the end of December 2025, payments totaling S/3.5 billion had been made to affiliates in response to their withdrawal requests. See “ITEM 4. INFORMATION ON THE COMPANY – 4.B Business Overview – (6) Supervision and Regulation – 6.2 Subsidiaries – 6.2.1 Peru”. Taxation Changes in U.S. laws or regulations applicable to our business, such as the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 (AMLA 2020) regulations, as well as other international regulations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) Common Reporting Standards (CRS) and the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework’s Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) rules, may have an adverse effect on our financial and operational performance by significantly increasing our compliance obligations. For a discussion of Peruvian, Chilean, and Colombian tax regulation, see “ITEM 10. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION – 10.E Taxation”. 29 Table of Contents Credicorp, as a Bermuda exempted company, may be adversely affected by any change in Bermuda law or regulation. The Economic Substance Act 2018 (as amended) of Bermuda (the ES Act) came into force on January 1, 2019. Pursuant to the ES Act, a registered entity, other than an entity which is resident for tax purposes in certain jurisdictions outside Bermuda (that is, a non-resident entity), that carries on as a business any one or more of the “relevant activities” referred to in the ES Act is considered to be in the scope of ES Act and must comply with the economic substance requirements to ensure that the entity is engaged in real economic activity in Bermuda. The ES Act may require in-scope Bermuda-registered entities that are engaged in such “relevant activities” to be directed and managed in Bermuda, have an adequate level of qualified employees in Bermuda, incur an adequate level of annual expenditures in Bermuda in relation to the relevant activity, maintain physical offices and premises in Bermuda and perform core income-generating activities in Bermuda in relation to the relevant activity. “Relevant activities” under the ES Act include the following: banking, insurance, fund management, financing and leasing, headquarters, shipping, distribution and service center, intellectual property and holding entities. Based on the current guidance issued pursuant to the ES Act, which was revised at the beginning of 2023, the Bermuda Registrar of Companies will consider an entity that carries on relevant activities to be engaged in those activities and within the scope of the ES Act, regardless of whether the entity earns any gross revenue from such activities during the relevant financial period. Both Credicorp Ltd. and Credicorp Capital Ltd. are Bermuda exempted companies, so the ES Act applies to them. Both companies are also considered “pure equity holding”, entities under the ES Act. All entities subject to the ES Act that undertake “relevant activities”, including all “pure equity holding” entities, must file annually with the Registrar of Companies an Economic Substance Declaration (the ESD), providing information in relation to the previous financial year (relevant financial period). The ESD requires the disclosure of certain key information applicable to assessing compliance with the economic substance requirements. Pure equity holding entities are currently subject to minimum economic substance requirements, including the requirement to comply with the applicable corporate governance requirements of the Companies Act 1981, the filing of an ESD, and maintaining adequate personnel and premises in Bermuda for holding and managing equity participations. An entity conducting the relevant activity of having a headquarters in Bermuda which generates gross revenue is required to satisfy the requirements under the ES Act in respect of that activity for that relevant financial period. However, an entity that earns no gross revenue in respect of such activity in any relevant financial period will not be required to satisfy the requirements under the ES Act with respect to activity for that relevant financial period but will still need to file an ESD. The Registrar of Companies is responsible for monitoring and enforcing the economic substance regime. The ES Act provides for civil penalties, subject to rights of appeal, of up to US$250,000 for non-compliance with the applicable economic substance requirements. If, after the applicable civil penalties have been exhausted, an entity continues to fail to comply, the Registrar of Companies may apply for a petition to the Supreme Court of Bermuda for an order for such terms as it considers appropriate. This may include an order to strike the entity off the Register of Companies. The ES Act also criminalized knowingly providing false declaration information to the Registrar of Companies, which is punishable by penalties of up to US$10,000, imprisonment for two years, or both. Other offshore jurisdictions released similar legislation that affects some of our offshore entities (including ASHC in the Cayman Islands). This other legislation imposes similar requirements and penalties. We could also be subject to changes in tax rates, the enactment of legislation implementing changes in taxation of international business activities, the adoption of other corporate tax reform policies, or other changes in tax legislation or policies which could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations. In October 2021, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (the OECD) Inclusive Framework reached an agreement on a “Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy” and, on 20 December 2021, the OECD’s Inclusive Framework published “Global Anti-Base Erosion,” or “GloBE” model rules (the GloBE Rules), which are a key component of the Two-Pillar Solution. 30 Table of Contents The GloBE model rules would apply to Multinational Enterprises (“MNEs”) with revenues of at least EUR750 million and provide for a coordinated system of taxation that imposes a “top-up” tax to ensure that an MNE pays a minimum rate of 15% tax on its net income in each country where it operates. Countries around the world have enacted, and are continuing to enact, legislation to implement the GloBE model rules. As the Two-Pillar Solution is subject to implementation by each member country, the timing and ultimate impact of any such changes on our tax obligations is uncertain. Such legislative initiatives may materially and adversely affect our plans to expand internationally and may negatively impact our tax liability, financial condition, and results of operations, and could increase our administrative expenses. These changes, as they take effect in various countries in which we do business, may also increase our taxes in these countries. For example, Bermuda enacted the Corporate Income Tax Act 2023 on 27 December 2023 (the “CIT Act”). Entities subject to tax under the CIT Act are the Bermuda constituent entities of MNEs. The definition of a MNE under the CIT Act follows the definition in the GloBE model roles i.e., a group with entities in more than one jurisdiction with consolidated revenues of at least EUR750 million for two out of the four previous fiscal years. If Bermuda constituent entities of a multi-national group are subject to tax under the CIT Act, such tax is charged at a rate of 15 per cent of the net taxable income of such constituent entities as determined in accordance with and subject to the adjustments set out in the CIT Act. The CIT Act does not impose any withholding tax, capital transfer tax, estate duty or inheritance tax, so there have been no such taxes payable by us or by our shareholders in respect of our shares following the effective date of January 1, 2025. The ES Act, CIT Act and future legislative initiatives may, among other things, negatively impact our tax liability, financial condition and results of operations. It could increase our administrative expenses, compliance and disclosure requirements, and increase the risks of administrative penalties for non-compliance with the applicable legislation. It may be difficult to serve process on or enforce judgments against us or our principals residing outside of the United States or to assert claims against our officers or Directors. A significant majority of our Directors and officers live outside the United States (principally in Peru). Most of our assets and those of our principal subsidiaries, as well as our principal subsidiaries’ respective legal domiciles, are located outside the United States. As a result, it may not be possible for investors to effect service of process within the United States upon us or our principal subsidiaries to initiate a civil suit under U.S. securities laws in U.S. courts. We have also been advised by our Peruvian counsel that judgments or decisions obtained under U.S. federal securities laws may not be recognized and enforceable in Peru unless certain requirements, which are required under Peruvian law for so-called exequatur proceedings, including those with respect to jurisdiction, due process and consistency with Peruvian law, are deemed to have been satisfied. Similarly, our Bermuda counsel have advised us that courts in Bermuda may not be able to enforce judgments obtained in other jurisdictions, or entertain actions in Bermuda, against us or our Directors or officers under the securities laws of those jurisdictions. In addition, judgments of U.S. courts obtained in actions under the United States federal securities laws may not be enforceable in other non-U.S. jurisdictions in which we or our principals operate or have assets. In addition, our Bye-laws contain a broad waiver by our shareholders of any claim or right of action, both individually and on our behalf, against any of our officers or Directors. This waiver limits the rights of shareholders to assert claims against our officers and Directors for any action taken by an officer or Director. It also limits the rights of shareholders to assert claims against officers for the failure of an officer or Director to take any action in the performance of his or her duties, except with respect to any matter involving willful negligence, willful default, fraud or dishonesty on the part of the officer or Director. As a result, it may be more difficult for our minority shareholders to assert claims against us or our Directors and officers, as compared to the shareholders of a U.S. company. Medical malpractice claims, professional negligence and adverse clinical outcomes that may arise from our medical services operations could lead to significant financial liabilities. These situations have the potential to not only result in substantial legal and settlement costs but also to cause reputational harm. The operation of hospitals and outpatient medical facilities involves inherent risks associated with the provision of medical care, including the risk of medical malpractice claims, professional negligence and adverse clinical outcomes. Claims or legal actions arising from alleged medical errors or failures to meet applicable standards of care could result in 31 Table of Contents significant financial costs, including damages, legal expenses and reputational harm, which may adversely affect the Group’s results of operations. The Group maintains insurance coverage for professional and general liability risks; however, such coverage may not be sufficient to fully cover all potential claims or losses. Industry and Market Risks We operate in a competitive environment that may limit our potential to grow and may put pressure on our margins and reduce our profitability. BCP Stand-alone and Mibanco have experienced increased competition, including increased pressure on margins. This is primarily a result of the following: •Highly liquid foreign-owned commercial banks and microfinance institutions in the market; •Local and foreign financial services, wealth management and capital markets institutions, with substantial capital, technology and marketing resources; and •Local pension funds that lend to BCP Stand-alone’s corporate customers through securities issuances. Larger Peruvian companies have gained access to new sources of capital through local and international capital markets, and BCP Stand-alone’s existing and new competitors, including non-banking institutions such as fintech companies, have increasingly made inroads into the higher margin, middle market and retail banking sectors. Such increased competition has affected BCP Stand-alone’s loan growth as well as reduced the average interest rates that BCP Stand-alone can charge its customers. Competitors may also dedicate greater resources to, and be more successful in, the development of technologically advanced products and services that may compete directly with BCP Stand-alone’s and Mibanco’s products and services. Such competition could adversely affect the adoption of BCP Stand-alone’s and Mibanco’s products and/or lead to adverse changes in the spending and saving habits of BCP Stand-alone’s and Mibanco’s customer base. If competing entities are successful in developing products and services that are more effective or less costly than the products and services developed by BCP Stand-alone and Mibanco, BCP Stand-alone’s and Mibanco’s products and services may be unable to compete successfully. BCP Stand-alone and Mibanco may not be able to maintain their respective market shares if they are not able to match their competitors’ loan pricing or keep pace with their development of new products and services. Even if BCP Stand-alone’s and Mibanco’s products and services prove to be more effective than those developed by other entities, such other entities may be more successful in marketing their products and services than BCP Stand-alone and Mibanco because of their greater financial resources, higher sales and marketing capacity or other similar factors. We also face increasing competition from non-banking and digital bank competitors in markets for some of our products and services. These non-banking competitors, including fintech and startup companies and other technology companies, have emerged in recent years with increasing digitalization, and these competitors may adversely affect our results of operations. Some of these competitors operate under different or reduced levels of regulation in comparison to the regular banking supervision that applies to BCP Stand-alone and Mibanco. Therefore, these non-banking competitors are not subject to the same specific solvency or liquidity requirements as banks. Some international banks and microfinance institutions have also sought and obtained authorization to open representative offices in Peru. With the increased competition, more individuals will have access to credit, and the percentage of the population using banking services will likely climb. This may eventually put downward pressure on interest rates. Any negative impact on BCP Stand-alone and Mibanco resulting from increased competition could have a material adverse effect on our results of operations and financial condition. For further detail about the competitive market in our LoBs, see “ITEM 4. INFORMATION ON THE COMPANY – 4.B. Business Overview – (5) Competition”. Our business and results of operations could be negatively impacted by a pandemic virus outbreak or other public health crises beyond our control. In March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic. This destructive pandemic forced governments around the world to take important measures to mitigate the contagion, such as the closure of international borders, severe mobilization restrictions and lockdowns. As a result, global GDP (as adjusted 32 Table of Contents for purchasing power parity) contracted sharply in 2020 (the sharpest contraction since the Great Depression of 1929), and the economies in which Credicorp operates (mainly Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile and Panama) were severely affected by two factors: (i) the effect on the global economy (such as the economic growth of our main trade partners like China and the United States, as well as lower commodity prices, mainly metals and oil), during the first half of 2020 (at the worst of the crisis, WTI oil and copper prices has fallen around approximately 80% and 25%, respectively); and (ii) the local effect of government measures to stop the COVID-19 outbreak, such as quarantines, forced economic shutdowns and populist initiatives. In 2020, GDP fell 10.9% in Peru, 6.1% in Chile, 7.2% in Colombia, 8.7% in Bolivia and 17.7% in Panama. Major disruptions in exchange rates and global capital flows were triggered by the pandemic. The value of emerging markets currencies against the US Dollar, including those from Latin America, dropped substantially. The Brazilian Real (BRL), Mexican Peso (MXN), Colombian Peso (COP) and Chilean Peso (CLP) all reached significantly low levels against the US Dollar at the beginning of the pandemic. To mitigate the negative effects of the pandemic on health and economic outcomes, governments around the globe took drastic fiscal measures that consisted of additional spending or forgone revenue, including direct transfers and tax relief measures, and provided liquidity support, through loans and government guarantees (like the “Reactiva Program” in Peru). Central banks delivered massive monetary stimuli by reducing policy rates to the zero lower bound in most developed and emerging economies and announcing quantitative easing programs to purchase sovereign and corporate bonds. Furthermore, in Chile and Peru, early withdrawals from pension funds were approved as a source of relief for households. These measures, however, came with a cost. Lower economic growth and higher spending weakened debt metrics significantly and caused credit rating agencies (CRAs) to issue many sovereign downgrades. According to a 2021 report from the Bennett Institute for Public Policy in England, between January 2020 and March 2021, three CRAs issued a total of 99 sovereign rating downgrades on 48 countries, affecting 35% of their rated sovereign portfolio. In the Latin American region, for instance, coupled with political instability, between 2020 and 2022, Chile’s sovereign credit rating was downgraded by one notch by Fitch and S&P to A- and A, respectively; Colombia lost its investment grade rating from Fitch and S&P; Peru and Panama suffered downgrades from the three agencies and are now two and one notch above investment grade (lowest possible rating for a security to be considered investment grade), respectively, when we consider the lowest rating of the three CRAs. Sovereign credit rating revisions often impact local companies, particularly on their funding cost through long-term debt issuances in foreign currency. Consequently, credit rating downgrades could adversely affect the results of Credicorp and its subsidiaries. Additionally, large fiscal stimulus programs and expansive monetary policies worldwide were also behind the worst inflation shock in four decades experienced post COVID-19. Future pandemic outbreaks (whether like COVID-19 or of a more deadly pathogen), would bring risks to the global economy and to Peru’s economy and our operations. A new pandemic could again deteriorate fiscal metrics and reduce economic outcomes. Hence, it would put new downward pressure on credit ratings. Actions taken by governmental authorities and other third parties in response to this risk may negatively impact our business, results of operations and financial condition. In general, some of the main economic indicators that may be affected by a pandemic include exchange rates, interest rates, credit spreads, commodity prices, GDP and sovereign government debt. Other possible effects on our businesses and operations of another pandemic outbreak or other international public health crisis could include the following: •The credit risk of Credicorp’s loan portfolio may be adversely affected. Resulting temporary closures, mobility restrictions, increases in unemployment rates and insufficient liquidity could negatively affect our business volume and the portfolio quality of our credit and investment portfolios. •Our insurance business may be adversely affected due to the possible increase in the level of claims, mainly in the life and health segments. •Possible government measures or pension reforms may lead to higher demand for early redemptions from clients, which could reduce management fees and adversely affect revenues in our pension fund business. •Prolonged economic stress and market disruptions may generate pressure on our liquidity management and lead to increased volatility in financial markets, such as disruption in fixed and equity income global markets (resulting in the fall of stock prices, including the price of Credicorp). Moreover, the increase in liquidity risk may result in limited and/or costly access to financing sources, an inability to access capital 33 Table of Contents markets, an increase in draws of outstanding credit lines and a change in the expected level of cash inflow as consequences of large-scale changes to loan interest rates or other terms. •In terms of non-financial risks, another contagion disease may affect our ability to continue operating. Additionally, the possibility of lockdowns may cause some of our suppliers to stop providing us with services for business continuity. Our financial statements, particularly our interest-earning assets and interest-bearing liabilities, could be exposed to fluctuations in interest rates, foreign currency exchange rates and exchange controls, which may adversely affect our financial condition and results of operations. The interest income we earn on our interest-earning assets and the interest expense we pay on our interest-bearing liabilities could be affected by changes in domestic and international market interest rates. These rates are sensitive to many factors beyond our control, including monetary policies and domestic and international economic and political conditions. We have implemented several policies to manage our interest rate risk exposure and seek proactively to update our interest rate risk profile to minimize losses and optimize net revenues; however, sudden and/or significant volatility in market interest rates could have a material adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations. For further information, see “ITEM 11. QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DISCLOSURES ABOUT RISK MANAGEMENT – Sensitivity to Changes in Interest Rates.” Since January 1, 2014, the functional currency of our financial statements has been the Sol; however, the Group’s subsidiaries generate revenues in Soles, U.S. Dollars, Bolivianos, Colombian Pesos and Chilean Pesos. As a consequence, the fluctuation of our functional currency against other currencies, or any exchange controls implemented in the countries in which we operate, could have an adverse impact on our financial condition and results of operations. Article 64 of the Peruvian Constitution guarantees the freedom to use and hold foreign currency. Consequently, under current law, the Peruvian government cannot impose restrictions on companies' ability to transfer Soles, U.S. Dollars, or other currencies from Peru to other countries, nor can it restrict the conversion of Peruvian currency into other currencies. However, there is a risk that such restrictions could be implemented in the future if constitutional amendments or other legal changes were adopted. We also face foreign exchange risk on credit that we extend through our banking business, which is primarily conducted through BCP Stand-alone. To address this risk, BCP Stand-alone identifies borrowers that may not meet their debt obligations due to currency mismatches by performing sensitivity analyses of the credit ratings of companies and the debt-service capacities of individuals. Then, we classify borrowers according to their level of foreign exchange credit risk exposure. We monitor these clients, and, on an ongoing basis, we revise our risk policies for underwriting loans and managing our portfolio of foreign currency-denominated loans. However, these policies may not sufficiently address our foreign exchange risk, resulting in adverse effects on our financial condition and results of operations. We have taken steps to manage the gap between our foreign currency-denominated assets and liabilities in several ways, including closely matching their volumes and maturities. Nevertheless, a sudden and significant depreciation of the Sol could have a material adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations. For further information, see “ITEM 11. QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DISCLOSURES ABOUT RISK MANAGEMENT – Foreign Currency Exchange Rate Risk”. Liquidity risks are inherent in our business activities. Liquidity risk is the risk of being unable to meet funding obligations as they come due, to capitalize on growth opportunities as they arise or to pay dividends without incurring unacceptable losses, costs or risks. This risk is inherent in any retail and commercial banking business and can be heightened by a number of factors, such as over-reliance on a particular source of funding, changes in credit ratings or market-wide phenomena such as market dislocation. The Group's liquidity arises primarily from customer deposits, principal and interest payments on loans and investment securities, net cash flow from operating activities and other sources. We must maintain sufficient funds to respond to the needs of depositors and borrowers. 34 Table of Contents Our liquidity, business activities and profitability may be adversely affected by an inability to access the debt capital markets or to sell assets during periods of market-wide or firm-specific liquidity constraints. Our ability to borrow on a secured or unsecured basis, and the cost of doing so, can be affected by increases in interest rates or credit spreads, a downturn in the geographic markets in which our loans are concentrated, the availability of credit, regulatory requirements relating to liquidity or the market perceptions of risk relating to us, certain of our counterparties or the banking sector or the financial services sector as a whole, including our perceived or actual creditworthiness, as well as other factors that may be outside our control. An inability to obtain financing in the unsecured long-term or short-term debt capital markets, or to access the secured lending markets, could have a substantial adverse effect on our liquidity. In challenging credit markets, our funding costs may increase, or we may be unable to raise funds to support or expand our businesses, adversely affecting our results of operations. If we are unable to raise needed funds in the capital markets (including through offerings of equity, regulatory capital securities and other debt), we may need to liquidate unencumbered assets to meet our liabilities. In a time of reduced liquidity, we may be unable to sell some of our assets, or we may need to sell assets at depressed prices. Either case could adversely affect our results of operations and financial condition. The Group relies significantly on its deposits for funding. The Group benefits from short-term funding sources, including primarily demand deposits, securities lending and time deposits. The Group's ability to generate deposits depends on its reputation, customer service and competitive pricing. Our access to deposits may also be adversely affected by the liquidity needs of our depositors, which may increase in an inflationary environment where they may be compelled to withdraw deposits in order to cover rising expenses. As a part of our liquidity management, we must ensure we can respond effectively to potential volatility in our customers’ deposit balances. Although we have been able to replace maturing or withdrawn deposits and advances historically as necessary, we might not be able to replace such funds in the future, especially if a large number of our depositors, or depositors with high deposit balances, seek to empty their accounts in a short period of time. We could encounter difficulty facing a significant deposit outflow, which could negatively affect our profitability or reputation. In circumstances in which our ability to generate needed liquidity is impaired, we may need access to non-core funding, such as borrowings from the BCRP, and other emergency sources. While we maintain access to these non-core funding sources, some sources are dependent on the availability of collateral and the counterparty’s willingness and ability to lend. Any long-term decline in deposit funding would adversely affect our liquidity, and we may not be able to manage the risk of deposit volatility effectively. Our investments measured at fair value through profit or loss and fair value through other comprehensive income expose us to market price volatility, liquidity declines and fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates, which may result in losses that could adversely affect our business, financial condition and operating results. In addition, our investments measured at amortized cost may expose us to market price volatility and liquidity shortcomings if sales of those investments become required for liquidity purposes. Price, liquidity and foreign exchange risks are inherent in the Group’s securities. Our investments at fair value through profit or loss may lead to gains or losses when sold or marked to market. Our investments at fair value through other comprehensive income may require us to record unrealized gains or losses through other comprehensive income when those investments are marked to market and in realized gains or losses when sold. Both types of investments measured at fair value may fluctuate from period to period due to numerous factors that are beyond our control, such as foreign currency exchange rates, interest rate levels, counterparty credit risks, and general market volatility. Losses from trading activities and realized or unrealized losses could have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition and operating results. Our investments measured at amortized cost may lead to gains or losses when sold due to liquidity requirements. These gains or losses occur due to numerous factors that are beyond our control, including interest rate levels, counterparties' credit risk and general market volatility. 35 Table of Contents Business Performance Risks A deterioration in the quality of our loan portfolio may adversely affect our results of operations. Given that a significant percentage of our income is related to lending activities, a significant deterioration in the quality of our loan portfolio would have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations. Problems with our borrowers may adversely affect our financial condition and results of operations. While loan portfolio risk associated with lending to certain economic sectors or clients in certain market segments can be mitigated through adequate diversification, our pursuit of opportunities in which we can charge higher interest rates, and thereby increase revenue, may have an impact on the profile of loan portfolio and risk exposure. In addition, loan concentration in commercial sectors is particularly salient in Peru, and any significant deterioration in such sectors may have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations. For additional detail on the composition of our loan portfolio, see “ITEM 4. INFORMATION ON THE COMPANY – 4.B Business Overview – (7) Selected Statistical Information – 7.3 Loan portfolio and – 7.3.3 Concentrations of loan portfolio and lending limits”. Our strategy includes increasing our exposure to market segments with heightened credit risk, including middle-market and consumer segments, such as unsecured small companies, and consumer loans and consumer mortgages, which have higher risk profiles compared to loans to large corporate customers. Given the changing composition of our loan portfolio and the possible adverse changes in the environment in which we operate, our future results may differ significantly from our past results. Errors or inaccuracies in risk models can have an adverse economic impact on our business, financial condition and results of operations. Model risk is defined as the possibility of incurring economic losses due to decisions that are made based on erroneous or imprecise models. Deficiencies at the model level may be generated by problems with data quality, methodologies, implementations and/or uses. This risk is relevant because the Group relies heavily on the use of models all throughout the credit management process, including prospecting, pricing, admission, portfolio monitoring, collection, provisions, internal calculations of economic capital and other aspects. Our use of models requires a comprehensive governance framework for the construction and monitoring of these models. Although the standards underlying our governance framework are updated and improved upon from time to time to mitigate the impact that severe or unexpected changes in the macro and micro economic environment could have on the risk quality of our portfolio, we cannot provide assurance that the models will be accurate or that severe or unexpected changes will not create risk for our loan portfolio. Our consumer and SME segments are particularly vulnerable to this risk. Accurate underwriting and setting of premiums are important risk management tools for primary insurance companies, such as Grupo Pacífico, but the estimates underlying our underwriting and premiums may be inaccurate. Grupo Pacífico’s operating performance and financial condition depend on its ability to underwrite and set premium rates accurately across a full spectrum of risks. In order to be profitable, Grupo Pacífico must generate sufficient premiums to offset losses, loss adjustment expenses and underwriting expenses. To price premium rates accurately, Grupo Pacífico must: •Collect and analyze a substantial volume of data; •Provide sufficient resources to its technical units; •Develop, test and apply appropriate rating formula; •Closely monitor changes in trends in a timely fashion; and •Predict both severity and frequency with reasonable accuracy. If Grupo Pacífico fails to accurately assess the risks that it assumes, or if it does not accurately estimate its retention, it may fail to establish adequate premium rates. Failure to establish adequate premium rates could reduce income and have a material adverse effect on Grupo Pacifico´s operating results or financial condition. Moreover, there is inherent uncertainty in the process of establishing life insurance reserves and P&C loss reserves. Reserves are estimates based on actuarial and statistical projections at a given point in time of what Grupo Pacífico ultimately expects to pay out on claims and of the related costs of adjusting those claims, based on the facts and circumstances then known. Factors affecting these projections include, among others: (i) in the case of life insurance reserves, changes in mortality or longevity rates, interest 36 Table of Contents rates, persistency rates and regulation; and (ii) in the case of P&C loss reserves, morbidity, changes in medical costs, repair costs and regulation. Any negative effect of inaccurate estimates or projections on Grupo Pacífico could have a material adverse effect on its results of operations and financial condition. While reinsurance is a tool for risk diversification that may help to reduce losses for a primary insurance company such as Grupo Pacífico, we face the possibility that the reinsured amount will be insufficient to fully cover incurred losses or that the reinsurance companies will be unable to honor their contractual obligations. Credicorp assumes reinsurance risk in the normal course of business for its insurance contracts, when applicable. Premiums and claims related to assumed reinsurance are recognized as income or expenses in the same manner as direct business, based on the product classification of the reinsured business. Assuming reinsurance risk exposes Credicorp to the risk of loss if the reinsurer is unable to meet its obligations for credit reasons, if the company underestimates the frequency or severity of claims, or if adverse changes occur in the underlying insurance exposures, which are not considered when purchasing coverage from the reinsurer. In the case of a catastrophic event that exceeds the confidence levels used for the purchase of reinsurance, which are based on models and practices aligned with the best market standards, we would face the risk that the reinsured amount may be insufficient to fully cover incurred losses. In that case, there would be a negative impact on our equity. Additionally, while Credicorp’s internal requirements with respect to reinsurer counterparty credit risk, as set by Grupo Pacífico’s risk management unit and approved by the Risk Committee, are more stringent than local regulatory requirements and include diversified placement of reinsurance, a failure by one or more of our counterparty reinsurance companies to honor their contractual obligations could have a material adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations. Risks not contemplated in our insurance policies may affect our results of operations. Insurance amounts are calculated through statistical analysis and then maintained to cover risks related to our operations, including, among others, internal and external fraud, computer crime, professional liability for services we provide, director’s and officer’s liability and general liability against general claims involving bodily injuries and property damage. However, the terms and conditions of the insurance policies we have may not cover losses we incur in connection with a specific event or incident or may cover only part of the losses we may incur. The insurance policies of Credicorp and its subsidiaries are underwritten by Grupo Pacífico. Grupo Pacífico reinsures the policies in the cases it deems appropriate due to the materiality of the risk. In addition, operational risk may arise from misalignment between the terms of reinsurance policies and those of local insurance contracts. Acquisitions, strategic partnerships and investments may not perform as expected, which could have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations. Acquisitions, strategic partnerships and investments may not perform as expected since our assessments and projections are based on assumptions with respect to operations, profitability and other matters that may subsequently prove to be incorrect. Future acquisitions, investments and alliances may not produce the anticipated synergies or perform in accordance with our expectations, which could have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition, and results of operation. For example, in 2024, the Group recorded an impairment in the following companies: Joinnus S.A. for S/12.0 million, Wally POS S.A.C for S/9.0 million, Sami Shop for S/4.0 million and Compañía Incubadora de Soluciones Móviles S.A. for S/2.3 million. In 2023, the Group recorded an impairment loss totaling S/71.9 million (equivalent to US$19.3 million or 75,199 million Colombian Pesos (COP)) for its investment in Mibanco Colombia (formerly Bancompartir) as a result of its assessment of the recoverable amount. In this assessment, the fair value of Mibanco Colombia was estimated to be 438,259 million COP (equivalent to US$113.2 million or S/419.4 million), which was less than its book value of 513,458 million COP (equivalent to US$132.5 million or S/491.3 million). For further detail, please see Note 10(b) (Intangible Assets and Goodwill) to the consolidated financial statements. Credicorp’s increasing investments in digital transformation and disruptive initiatives may fail to achieve the ambitions, efficiencies, and other performance improvements that it is pursuing. As part of its transformation strategy, Credicorp is increasing investments in developing digital capabilities such as IT, data analytics and cybersecurity. The Company is spending significant resources with the goal of attracting digital 37 Table of Contents talent, evolving its agile culture to maximize client experience and strengthening its self-disruptive mindset. Moreover, Credicorp is increasing its investments in innovation and disruptive initiatives. Finally, as part of its transformation strategy, Credicorp is increasing investments in developing artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities and implementing use cases that increase both productivity and customer experience. These investments may fail to achieve their ambitions, limiting the company’s potential for acquisition of clients, income generation, efficiency and other performance improvements described in “ITEM 4. INFORMATION ON THE COMPANY – 4.B Business Overview – (1) Credicorp Overview”. Credicorp continues to invest in its technology and digital and AI capabilities across its franchises, including digital platforms, data management and cloud-based solutions. Credicorp has also been pursuing productivity and operational performance improvements through the evolution of its diverse business models. For example, we aim for all Credicorp employees to use AI tools to improve their productivity. In microfinance, Mibanco has leveraged data and analytics to develop centralized credit assessment capabilities and generate loan offers to current clients and has leveraged alternative channels, such as mobile banking, call centers and home banking, among others, to increase loan disbursements. In addition, Credicorp has been making other investments in new ventures within its LoBs, such as our Yape mobile application, and through its corporate venture capital center Krealo, which is investing in fintech startups, such as Tenpo SpA (Tenpo), Credicorp Capital Negocios Digitales S.A.S. (Tyba), Compañía Incubadora de Soluciones Móviles S.A. (Culqi), among others. For additional detail about Credicorp's Innovation strategy and our investment in disruptive initiatives, please see “ITEM 4. INFORMATION ON THE COMPANY – 4.B Business Overview – (1) Credicorp Overview – Our Innovation Strategy”. If Credicorp fails to adequately invest in its digital and innovation strategy, and artificial intelligence capabilities, our ability to compete or to provide superior customer experience could be adversely affected. There is no guarantee, however, that these or other initiatives at Credicorp will achieve the ambitions, efficiencies, profitability or other performance improvements that the Company is pursuing or that they will have any benefits at all. Furthermore, Credicorp’s digital investments involve execution complexity and could result in additional losses, charges or other negative financial impacts. For example, Credicorp may not be able to achieve its objectives related to monetization of disruptive initiatives due to limited available information about new and under-penetrated markets that these initiatives target. The risks associated with disruptive initiatives encompass both technological and human factors. On the technical side, there are notable challenges such as current limitations in modulating conversational tone, which may impede adaptation to diverse communication contexts; the need to enhance dialogue protection against threats like prompt injection or data poisoning, which could undermine the integrity and security of interactions; and the persistent risk of AI-generated hallucinations that may affect the reliability of the solutions. From a user perspective, responses to these technologies will vary: while some individuals may embrace new communication methods, others will continue to favor direct human interaction. Additionally, ensuring that AI-generated conversations are truly indistinguishable from those between humans remains a considerable challenge, which could impact user trust and satisfaction. Credicorp’s digital and artificial intelligence investments, and other initiatives, are subject to changes in business strategy, market environment and regulatory expectations, which could make the initiatives more costly and more challenging to implement and limit their effectiveness. Moreover, Credicorp’s ability to achieve expected returns on its investments and costs savings depends partially on factors that it cannot control, including, among others, interest rates; inflation; customer, client and competitor actions; and ongoing regulatory changes. The shortage of specialized talent can negatively affect the implementation of our strategy. Organizations globally are experiencing significant transformations due to the acceleration of digitalization and the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence, which is redefining roles and generating new skill demands, particularly in data, technology, and AI-related capabilities. The demand for digital skills and specialized profiles driven by artificial intelligence in the financial industry is far exceeding the supply, creating a talent gap that poses a considerable risk to organizations. For Credicorp, the talent shortage due to the emergence of new AI-enabled roles and the increased demand for digital and analytical capabilities represents a strategic challenge that can impact the ability to innovate and improve operational efficiency, limiting the implementation of key technological initiatives and adaptation to new industry trends. The clinics business is highly dependent on the availability and retention of qualified medical professionals, including physicians, nurses and specialized healthcare staff. Risks include workforce shortages, high turnover, labor 38 Table of Contents disputes, non-compliance with labor regulations, and dependency on key medical personnel. Inability to attract or retain qualified staff could negatively impact service continuity, quality of care and operational performance. Our ability to pay dividends to shareholders and to pay corporate expenses may be adversely affected by the ability of our subsidiaries to pay dividends to us. As a holding company, our ability to make dividend payments, if any, and to pay corporate expenses depends on the receipt of dividends and other distributions from our operating subsidiaries. Our principal operating subsidiaries are BCP Stand-alone, BCP Bolivia, Mibanco, Mibanco Colombia, Grupo Pacífico, ASB Bank Corp., Prima AFP and Credicorp Capital. Subject to certain minimum liquidity, reserve and capital adequacy requirements under applicable regulations, we are able to cause our subsidiaries to declare dividends. If our subsidiaries do not have funds available or are otherwise restricted from paying us dividends, we may be limited in our ability to pay dividends to shareholders. Currently, apart from the minimum capital requirements, there are no restrictions on the ability of BCP Stand-alone, BCP Bolivia, Mibanco, Mibanco Colombia, Grupo Pacífico, ASB Bank Corp., Prima AFP or Credicorp Capital to pay dividends abroad. In addition, our right to participate in the distribution of assets of any subsidiary, upon any subsidiary’s liquidation or reorganization (with the holders of our securities able to benefit indirectly from such distribution), is subject to the prior claims of creditors of that subsidiary, except where we are considered an unsubordinated creditor of the subsidiary. Accordingly, our securities will effectively be subordinated to all existing and future liabilities of our subsidiaries, and holders of our securities should look only to our assets for payments. Since our main Peruvian subsidiaries pay dividends considering the accumulated results shown in the financial statements prepared under local GAAP applicable to financial entities, there could be differences between local GAAP and IFRS. The main differences between these are concentrated in the application of (i) IFRS 9, for both the methodology used to determine the provision for credit losses in loan portfolio and for the determination of financial income for loans; and (ii) IFRS 17, for the methodology used to determine Net Interest Income, Other Non-Core Income, Insurance and Reinsurance Result, and Total Expenses. Finally, the value of any dividend paid by our operating subsidiaries that declare dividends in a currency different from Credicorp’s dividends (such as ASB Bank Corp., BCP Bolivia, Credicorp Capital Holding Chile and Credicorp Capital Holding Colombia) is subject to the impact of the exchange rate of the dividend’s currency against Credicorp’s functional currency. This foreign currency exchange could have a negative impact on our ability to pay dividends to shareholders. For further details about Credicorp’s Dividend Policy refer to “ITEM 8. FINANCIAL INFORMATION – 8.A Consolidated Statements and Other Financial Information – (3) Dividend Policy”. Operational Risks A failure in, or breach of, our operational or security systems, fraud by our employees or outsiders, and other operational errors of our internal controls system could temporarily interrupt our businesses, increase our costs and cause losses. The risk of the occurrence of, or a material adverse effect caused by, security breaches remain present due to the constant adoption of new technologies and the interoperability between them, the use of digital profiles and processes, and the use and integration of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies into its operations. This risk is also present due to transfer of data among remote workers, cloud servers and office workers, given the transition to a more permanent hybrid workforce. Similarly, exposure to malicious external actors or insiders (i.e., security breaches) or operational errors affecting the confidentiality, availability and integrity of our main information assets (data bases, servers, software digital information associated with processes, among others) could result in significant losses of customer data and/or other types of confidential information, losses of revenue and customers, reputational harm and legal risks, any of which could directly affect our business and operations. In addition, the increased use of information technology (IT) and other IT resources can increase technological risks due to failures or problems in the management of technological tools and operational risks due to deficiencies or failures in processes or resources. We also rely on third-party service providers that store, transmit and process part of our confidential information and that of our clients, which constitutes a supply chain risk. In addition, in recent years, there has been an increase in the number and sophistication of cyberattacks not only against financial institutions but also their providers worldwide. Clinics process large volumes of sensitive personal and health-related data and are therefore exposed to risks of data breaches, cyberattacks, ransomware incidents or unauthorized access. Failure to adequately protect patient information 39 Table of Contents or comply with data protection regulations may result in administrative sanctions, litigation, loss of patient trust and reputational harm. For further detail about the integration of cybersecurity processes into risk management at Credicorp, see item “ITEM 16K. CYBERSECURITY”. Our Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Terrorist Financing (CTF) measures are designed to safeguard our operations and uphold the highest standards of compliance; however, no system can guarantee absolute prevention, and we may not be able to prevent third parties from using as a conduit for illicit activities. While our framework significantly reduces the likelihood of illicit activities and reinforces the integrity of our business, any failure could damage our reputation or expose us to fines, sanctions or legal enforcement, any of which could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations. As financial institutions, our subsidiaries must comply with significant anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing laws and regulations, as well as applicable international standards and recommendations such as those provided by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and local directives. In line with these requirements, our group has developed a comprehensive risk-based approach strategy to implement an Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Terrorism Financing (CTF) Program that seeks to prevent third parties from channeling illicit funds through Credicorp. At Credicorp, our financial institutions have continued to face many AML/CTF risks such as fines, commercial sanctions or legal enforcement. In Peru, the SBS published the Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Financing of Terrorism (AML/AFT) Risk Management Regulation in 2015 (SBS Resolution No. 2660-2015 and subsequent amendments), which includes provisions that extend the duties and functions of the Compliance Officer, clarify the obligation of companies to carry out customer classification under strict terms, establish enhanced due diligence for high risk customers and set out the guidelines for transferring funds, as well as many other specific requirements for daily transactions. These guidelines have introduced significant operational challenges, including increased exposure to compliance risks and the necessity for ongoing investment in advanced technology to ensure adherence to the stringent requirements of the regulation. Environmental, Social and Governance Risks Natural disasters in Peru and in the countries where we operate could disrupt our businesses and affect our results of operations and financial condition. Peru continues to be periodically exposed to the effects of the El Niño Phenomenon (“El Niño”), an oceanic and atmospheric event associated with the warming of the central and eastern tropical Pacific Ocean that can generate heavy rainfall, flooding and landslides, particularly along the northern coast and in central Andean regions. Historically, strong El Niño episodes, such as those that occurred in 1997–1998 and in 2017, have generated significant impacts on the Peruvian economy. Recently, we experienced a strong Coastal El Niño in 2023, which was intensified by Cyclone Yaku and brought heavy rains and floods and generated supply disruptions along Peru’s North Coast. These events significantly affected anchovy fishing, agriculture, primary manufacturing, and domestic textile production. During 2025, we did not experience an El Niño nor any other climatic phenomenon. However, as of April 2026, the Multisectoral Commission responsible for the National Study of the Phenomenon (ENFEN) estimates a moderate El Niño from June 2026 through July 2026. While we cannot precisely forecast future El Niño events or their potential effects on our country's economy, our clients' financial performance, or the quality of our loan portfolio, we recognize that this phenomenon will continue to affect the country periodically, as it has in the past. Therefore, we remain vigilant and proactively prepare for its potential impacts. We may incur financial losses and damages to our reputation from ESG risks, which recently have been recognized as increasingly relevant because they can affect business continuity and the creation of long-term value for our stakeholders. ESG risks may adversely affect our business continuity and our ability to create long-term value for our stakeholders. Environmental risks, for example, may affect our businesses, particularly within our banking, asset 40 Table of Contents management and insurance subsidiaries. The market increasingly demands a proactive approach to issues affecting the environment from companies like ours, and thus a perception of lack of environmental responsibility could damage our reputation. Moreover, we operate in a region susceptible to climate-related challenges. These environmental issues have the potential to have an adverse impact on our clients, affecting their payment capabilities and business continuity, likewise affecting our own operation. Among these environmental issues, climate change is particularly important to Credicorp, potentially exposing us to physical and transition risks, which may impact other traditional risks, such as credit, operational, reputational and others. Social issues related to managing employees, customers and communities’ relationships may affect our business mainly through a talent or capabilities deficit, high training costs, compliance failures, operational inefficiencies and reputational risks. Finally, corporate governance issues may affect our business mainly through reputational risk, if we are perceived by stakeholders as a company that has any controversy related to transparency, Board structure and remuneration or stakeholder governance. 41 Table of Contents