Except as set forth below, there have been no material changes to the Risk Factors last reported under Part I, Item 1A of the registrant’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2025, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 27, 2026. The trading prices of many digital assets, including ether, have experienced extreme volatility in recent periods and may continue to do so. Extreme volatility in the future, including further declines in the trading prices of ether, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value. The trading prices of many digital assets, including ether, have experienced extreme volatility in recent periods and may continue to do so. For instance, there were steep increases in the value of certain digital assets, including ether, over the course of 2021, and multiple market observers asserted that digital assets were experiencing a “bubble.” These increases were followed by steep drawdowns throughout 2022 in digital asset trading prices, including for ether. After reaching an all-time high of approximately $4,950 in August 2025, the price of ether declined to below $1,600 in June 2026, representing a drawdown of more than 65%, and there can be no assurance that the price of ether will not decline further. These episodes of rapid price appreciation followed by steep drawdowns have occurred multiple times throughout ether’s history, including in 2021-2022 and 2025-2026. For example, ether lost approximately 12.2% of its value according to some sources in mid-October 2025 as part of wider digital asset market turmoil, widely attributed to global trade tensions, which triggered a number of dislocations in the digital asset market (the “October 2025 Flash Crash”), including liquidations of up to $20 billion in collateral in the form of various digital assets (including, but not limited to, ether) securing trades (particularly perpetual futures contracts and various forms of financing transactions), along with reported service interruptions, halted orders, forced unwinding of trades, and other issues, across centralized and decentralized exchanges. Digital asset prices, including the price of ether, declined significantly during the first half of 2026. As of the date of this report, the price of ether remains significantly below its August 2025 all-time high, and digital asset prices continue to fluctuate significantly. Extreme volatility may persist, and the value of the Shares may significantly decline in the future without recovery. The digital asset markets may still be experiencing a bubble or may experience a bubble again in the future. For example, in the first half of 2022, each of Celsius Network, Voyager Digital Ltd., and Three Arrows Capital declared bankruptcy, resulting in a loss of confidence in participants of the digital asset ecosystem and negative publicity surrounding digital assets more broadly. In November 2022, FTX Trading Ltd. (“FTX”), one of the largest digital asset platforms by volume at the time, halted customer withdrawals amid rumors of the company’s liquidity issues and likely insolvency, which were subsequently corroborated by its CEO. Shortly thereafter, FTX’s CEO resigned and FTX and many of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in the United States, while other affiliates have entered insolvency, liquidation, or similar proceedings around the globe, following which the U.S. Department of Justice brought criminal fraud and other charges, and the SEC and CFTC brought civil securities and commodities fraud charges, against certain of FTX’s and its affiliates’ senior executives, including its former CEO. In addition, several other entities in the digital asset industry filed for bankruptcy following FTX’s bankruptcy filing, such as BlockFi Inc. and Genesis Global Capital, LLC (“Genesis”). In response to these events (collectively, the “2022 Events”), the digital asset markets have experienced extreme price volatility and other entities in the digital asset industry have been, and may continue to be, negatively affected, further undermining confidence in the digital asset markets. These events have also negatively impacted the liquidity of the digital asset markets as certain entities affiliated with FTX engaged in significant trading activity. If the liquidity of the digital asset markets continues to be negatively impacted by these events, the prices of digital assets, including ether, may continue to experience significant volatility or declines and confidence in the digital asset markets may be further undermined. In addition, following the 2022 Events, regulatory and enforcement scrutiny of the digital asset industry increased, including from, among others, the Department of Justice, the SEC, the CFTC, the White House and Congress, as well as state regulators and authorities, and the digital asset industry remains subject to significant attention from regulators, legislators and policymakers. These events are continuing to develop, and the full facts are continuing to emerge. It is not possible to predict at this time all of the risks that they may pose to the Trust, its service providers or the digital asset industry as a whole. The prices of some digital assets, including ether, may continue to fluctuate in response to actual or perceived political, legislative, regulatory and enforcement developments in the United States. Following the 2024 U.S. presidential election, the current administration has stated policy positions and taken actions that some market participants may view as supportive of the digital asset industry, including actions directed at promoting U.S. leadership in digital assets and financial technology and encouraging greater regulatory clarity for blockchain technology and digital assets. In addition, the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act of 2025 (“GENIUS Act”), which establishes a federal framework for payment stablecoins, was enacted in July 2025. The Digital Asset Market Clarity Act of 2025 (the “CLARITY Act”), which is intended to establish a federal market-structure framework for certain digital assets, passed the U.S. House of Representatives in July 2025 and was advanced by the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in May 2026. In July 2026, Senate Republicans released updated bill text for the CLARITY Act. Although negotiations regarding the legislation remain ongoing, the CLARITY Act has not been enacted, and its prospects remain uncertain. Market expectations regarding the administration, Congress, federal regulators, or future legislation or rulemaking may contribute to increases in digital asset prices or valuations. There can be no assurance that those expectations will be realized, that any enacted or proposed legislation or regulation will benefit the digital asset industry generally or ether specifically, or that digital asset prices will rise or maintain their current levels. Delays in, changes to, or adverse developments relating to implementation of the GENIUS Act, enactment of the CLARITY Act or similar legislation, or other federal or state regulatory actions could negatively affect market sentiment, liquidity, trading activity, or the prices of digital assets, including ether. Any resulting decline in the price of ether could cause a reduction in the value of the Shares and cause Shareholders to suffer losses. Moreover, there can be no assurance that political sentiments toward the digital asset industry, or market perceptions of those sentiments, will not shift over time. 14 Table of Contents On March 6, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order for the “Establishment of the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve and United States Digital Asset Stockpile” (the “Order”). The Order requires the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (the “U.S. Treasury Department”) to establish two offices to administer and maintain a “Strategic Bitcoin Reserve” (the “Bitcoin Reserve”) and a U.S. Digital Asset Stockpile (the “Digital Asset Stockpile”), respectively. The Bitcoin Reserve is intended to be capitalized with bitcoin forfeited as part of U.S. criminal or civil proceedings or in satisfaction of penalties imposed by executive agencies. The Order directs the Secretaries of the U.S. Treasury Department and the U.S. Department of Commerce to develop budget-neutral strategies for acquiring additional bitcoin for the Bitcoin Reserve. As established by the Order, the Bitcoin Reserve will not contain ether, and there can be no assurance, and there is no present indication, that it would be changed to include ether in the future. The Digital Asset Stockpile is intended to be capitalized initially with digital assets other than bitcoin forfeited as part of criminal or civil asset forfeiture proceedings, which could include ether; however, there will be no new acquisitions of ether as part of the Digital Asset Stockpile. The anticipation of a U.S. government-funded strategic cryptocurrency reserve may have motivated large-scale purchases of ether in the expectation of the U.S. government potentially acquiring ether to fund such an expected reserve, and the market price of ether may have decreased as a result of the ultimate content of the Order, which did not ultimately provide for acquisition of ether as part of the Bitcoin Reserve, though ether could be held as part of the Digital Asset Stockpile. While legislation has been introduced in the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives, which would direct the acquisition of one million bitcoin by the federal government over a five-year period, no such similar federal legislation has been introduced that would provide for acquiring ether. Even if such legislation providing for the acquisition of ether were to be introduced at the federal level, it could fail to pass. In addition, in May 2026, legislation styled the American Reserve Modernization Act of 2026 was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives, which would, among other things, establish the Bitcoin Reserve and a Digital Asset Stockpile in statute and require the consolidation of digital assets held by federal agencies within the U.S. Treasury Department. Bills have also been introduced in several state legislatures to authorize the acquisition of bitcoin by state governments or their instrumentalities, some of which have failed to pass; however, the Sponsor is not aware as of the date of this report that similar legislation at the state level has been introduced in respect of ether, in the same quantity as legislation in respect of bitcoin. If now or in the future, the U.S. federal government or any state government or any instrumentality thereof does not announce ether acquisition plans or does announce such plans, but these plans fall short of market expectations, the price of ether may decline, which may impact Share value. Even if government acquisitions of ether were to occur or if legislation requiring acquisitions of ether is enacted, the price of ether may decline if there are implementation challenges, unexpected difficulties, or policy or legal reversals, any of which may negatively impact Share value. Further, executive orders such as the Order are subject to change and can be reversed or overturned. The enduring existence and size of the Digital Asset Stockpile is subject to complex challenges and uncertainty that makes it difficult to evaluate its effect on the value of ether and the Shares, now or in the future. There can be no assurance that any particular legislation will ever be introduced or passed at either the federal or state level providing for the acquisition of ether by governmental instrumentalities. Extreme volatility in the future, including further declines in the trading prices of ether, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value. The Trust is not actively managed and will not take any action to take advantage of, or mitigate the impacts of, volatility in the price of ether. The value of the Shares is subject to a number of factors relating to the fundamental investment characteristics of ether as a digital asset, including the fact that digital assets are bearer instruments and loss, theft, destruction, or compromise of the associated private keys could result in permanent loss of the asset, and the capabilities and development of blockchain technologies such as the Ethereum blockchain. Ether was only launched in 2015, and the medium-to-long term value of the Shares is subject to a number of factors relating to the capabilities and development of blockchain technologies, such as the recentness of their development, their dependence on the internet and other technologies, their dependence on the role played by users, developers and validators and the potential for malicious activity. For example, the realization of one or more of the following risks could materially adversely affect the value of the Shares: ● Digital asset networks, including the Ethereum peer-to-peer network and associated blockchain ledger (such blockchain, the “Ethereum blockchain” and together with the peer-to-peer network, the “Ethereum network” or “Layer 1 Ethereum network”), and the software used to operate them are in the early stages of development. Given the recentness of the development of digital asset networks, digital assets may not function as intended and parties may be unwilling to use digital assets, which would dampen the growth, if any, of digital asset networks. Because ether is a digital asset, the value of the Shares is subject to a number of factors relating to the fundamental investment characteristics of digital assets, including the fact that digital assets are bearer instruments and loss, theft, compromise, or destruction of the associated private keys could result in permanent loss of the asset. ● Digital assets, including ether, are controllable only by the possessor of both the unique public key and private key or keys relating to the Ethereum network address, or “wallet,” at which the digital asset is held. Private keys must be safeguarded and kept private in order to prevent a third party from accessing the digital asset held in such wallet. The loss, theft, compromise or destruction of a private key required to access a digital asset may be irreversible. If a private key is lost, stolen, destroyed or otherwise compromised and no backup of the private key is accessible, the owner would be unable to access the digital asset corresponding to that private key and the private key will not be capable of being restored by the digital asset network, resulting in the total loss of the value of the digital asset linked to the private key. ● Digital asset networks are dependent upon the internet. A disruption of the internet or a digital asset network, such as the Ethereum network, would affect the ability to transfer digital assets, including ether, and, consequently, their value. ● The acceptance of software patches or upgrades by some, but not all, nodes, users and validators in a digital asset network, such as the Ethereum network, could result in a “fork” in such network’s blockchain, including the Ethereum blockchain, resulting in the operation of multiple separate networks. 15 Table of Contents ● Governance of the Ethereum network is by voluntary consensus and open competition. As a result, there may be a lack of consensus or clarity on the governance of the Ethereum network, which may stymie the Ethereum network’s utility and ability to grow and face challenges. In particular, it may be difficult to find solutions or marshal sufficient effort to overcome any future problems on the Ethereum network, especially long-term problems. ● The foregoing notwithstanding, the Ethereum network’s protocol is informally overseen by a collective of core developers who, along with members of the Ethereum community, can introduce proposals, known as Ethereum Improvement Proposals (“EIPs”), for updating the Ethereum network. The core developers evolve over time, largely based on self-determined participation. An Ethereum client (“Ethereum Client”) is a software application that implements the Ethereum network specification and communicates with the Ethereum network. A “node” is a computer or other device that has downloaded the Ethereum Client and is connected to other computers also running the Ethereum Client software, together forming the Ethereum network. To the extent that node operators update their individual Ethereum Client to new specifications, the Ethereum network could be subject to changes that may adversely affect the value of ether. In addition, if a digital asset network has high-profile contributors, the perception that such contributors will no longer contribute to the network could have an adverse effect on the market price of the related digital asset. ● Over the past several years, digital asset validator operations have evolved from individual users to “professionalized” validating operations using proprietary hardware or sophisticated machines. If the profit margins of digital asset validating operations are not sufficiently high, including due to a decrease in transaction fees, validators are more likely to immediately sell tokens earned by validating, resulting in an increase in liquid supply of that digital asset, which would generally tend to reduce that digital asset’s market price. ● To the extent that any validators cease to record transactions that do not include the payment of a transaction fee in solved blocks or do not record a transaction because the transaction fee is too low, such transactions will not be recorded on the Ethereum blockchain until a block is validated by a validator who does not require the payment of transaction fees or is willing to accept a lower fee. Any widespread delays in the recording of transactions could result in a loss of confidence in a digital asset network. ● Many digital asset networks, including the Ethereum network, face significant scaling challenges and may periodically be upgraded with various features designed to increase the speed of digital asset transactions and the number of transactions that can be processed in a given period (known as “throughput”). These attempts to increase the volume of transactions may not be effective or may result in unforeseen problems or issues, and such upgrades may fail, resulting in potentially irreparable damage to the Ethereum network and the value of ether. ● Moreover, in the past, bugs, defects, and flaws in the source code for digital assets have been exposed and exploited, including flaws that disrupted normal Ethereum network, Ethereum Client, or dApp and smart contract operations or disabled related functionality for users, exposed users’ personal information and/or resulted in the theft of users’ digital assets. For example, in May 2023, the main Ethereum network itself reportedly suffered outages or bugs that for a short time prevented transactions from finalizing and being recorded in blocks twice in two days. Major Ethereum Clients which nodes use to access the Ethereum network, such as Go-Ethereum (“Geth”), Besu and Nethermind, have in the past suffered outages or disruptions due to bugs. For more on an unplanned fork involving Geth clients, see “-A temporary or permanent “fork” could adversely affect the value of the Shares.” The cryptographic algorithms securing the Ethereum network, in particular its elliptic-curve signature schemes, could prove to be flawed or otherwise vulnerable to advances in computing technology, particularly quantum computing. Quantum computing technology is an emerging phenomenon which, because it is still developing, makes it difficult to predict its ultimate effect on the future value of ether and other digital assets. However, if quantum computing technology is able to advance and significantly increase its capacity relative to the capacity of today’s leading quantum computers, it could potentially undermine the viability of many of the cryptographic algorithms used across the world’s information technology infrastructure, including the cryptographic algorithms used for digital assets like ether. In particular, the Ethereum network relies on elliptic-curve cryptography not only for the digital signatures used to authorize transfers of ether from user accounts, but also for the digital signatures used by validators to secure the Ethereum network’s proof-of-stake consensus mechanism and for certain cryptographic commitments and proofs used to verify data on, and support applications built on, the Ethereum network. A sufficiently advanced quantum computer could potentially derive private keys from public keys that have been exposed on the Ethereum blockchain, including public keys that are exposed when an account initiates a transaction. The extent of this risk may depend on, among other things, whether public keys have been exposed, account usage patterns, the timing and manner of transfers, and the wallet-generation, key-management and transaction-signing practices of the Ether Custodian and other service providers. If quantum computing is able to advance in that way, there is a risk that quantum computing could result in the cryptography underlying the Ethereum network becoming ineffective, which, if realized, could compromise the security of the Ethereum network, including its consensus mechanism, or allow a malicious actor to compromise the wallets holding ether owned by the Trust or others on the Ethereum network, which would result in losses to Shareholders. While various actors in the Ethereum community are taking steps to enable the use of post-quantum or quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms, there is no guarantee that new post-quantum or quantum-resistant architectures will be built and appropriate transitions will be implemented across the multiple layers of the Ethereum network at scale in a timely manner or that any such transition would occur without bugs, security vulnerabilities, increased transaction costs, reduced network functionality or other disruption; any such changes could require the achievement of broad consensus within the Ethereum network community and a fork (or multiple forks), and there can be no assurance that such consensus would be achieved or the changes implemented successfully. See “—Changes in the governance of a digital asset network may not receive sufficient support from users and validators, which may negatively affect that digital asset network’s ability to grow and respond to challenges” and “—A temporary or permanent “fork” could adversely affect the value of the Shares.” If any of the foregoing were to occur, it could result in losses to Shareholders. In any of these circumstances, a malicious actor may be able to compromise the security of the Ethereum network or take the Trust’s ether, which would adversely affect the value of the Shares. In addition, because a significant amount of ether is held in accounts whose public keys have already been exposed, a sufficiently advanced quantum computer could be used to misappropriate that ether, even if the Trust’s own ether were not compromised, undermining confidence in the Ethereum network and depressing the price of ether, which would adversely affect the value of the Shares. Moreover, normal operations and functionality of the Ethereum network may be negatively affected. Such losses of functionality could lead to the Ethereum network losing attractiveness to users, nodes, validators, or other stakeholders, thereby dampening demand for ether. Even if another digital asset other than ether were affected by similar circumstances, any reduction in confidence in the source code or cryptography underlying digital assets generally could negatively affect the demand for digital assets and therefore adversely affect the value of the Shares. 16 Table of Contents ● The Ethereum network has been in the process of implementing a series of software upgrades and other changes to its protocol, which were previously referred to collectively as “Ethereum 2.0” and some of which were implemented during 2022, such as the Bellatrix and Paris planned forks (defined below) that transitioned the Ethereum network from a proof-of-work consensus mechanism to a proof-of-stake consensus mechanism (“the Merge”). These upgrades have resulted in, and are expected to continue to result in, changes to the Ethereum network. Many of the contemplated upgrades to the Ethereum network will include updates to material aspects of its source code. Although some of these upgrades have been successfully implemented, such as the Merge, which was completed in September 2022, there is no guarantee that there are not undiscovered flaws that will emerge in the future even in upgrades previously considered successful, and previously successful upgrades do not guarantee that future upgrades will be successful. Any such undiscovered flaws, or the failure to properly implement future changes, could have a material adverse effect on the value of ether and the value of the Shares. One completed upgrade is known as the “Shanghai” upgrade, which allows users to unstake their ether and remove it from the relevant smart contract. As a result of these or future upgrades, it is possible that significant volumes of currently locked and illiquid ether could become unlocked and sold, which could increase volatility in ether prices or have a material adverse effect on the value of ether and the value of the Shares. Upgrades currently being considered to increase throughput and promote scaling, such as “sharding” the Layer 1 Ethereum network or greater reliance on so-called “Layer 2” solutions, could have effects which are difficult to anticipate at this time, but could - if unsuccessfully implemented, or if they contain undiscovered flaws - materially adversely impact or even effectively eliminate the value of ether, and therefore impact the price of the Shares. In addition, the acceptance of software patches or upgrades by a significant, but not overwhelming, percentage of the users and validators in a digital asset network could result in a “fork” in such network’s blockchain, resulting in the operation of multiple separate networks. See “-A temporary or permanent “fork” could adversely affect the value of the Shares” for additional information. ● The Ethereum network is still in the process of developing and making significant decisions that will affect policies that govern the supply and issuance of ether as well as other Ethereum network protocols. For example, the Ethereum network has on occasion reduced the quantity of ether rewarded per block and may make additional changes in the future. The open-source nature of many digital asset network protocols, such as the protocol for the Ethereum network, means that developers and other contributors are generally not directly compensated for their contributions in maintaining and developing such protocols. As a result, the developers and other contributors of a particular digital asset may lack a financial incentive to maintain or develop the network, or may lack the resources to adequately address emerging issues. Alternatively, some developers may be funded by companies whose interests are at odds with other participants in a particular digital asset network. If the Ethereum network does not successfully develop its policies on supply and issuance and other major design decisions, or does so in a manner that is not attractive to network participants, it could lead to a decline in adoption of the Ethereum network and price of ether. ● Decentralized application and smart contract developers depend on being able to obtain ether to run their programs and operate their businesses. In particular, decentralized applications and smart contracts require ether in order to pay the gas fees needed to power such applications and smart contracts and execute transactions. As such, they represent a significant source of demand for ether. Ether’s price volatility (particularly where ether prices increase), or the Ethereum network’s wider inability to meet the demands of decentralized applications and smart contracts in terms of inexpensive, reliable, and prompt transaction execution (including during congested periods), or to solve its scaling challenges or increase its throughput, may discourage such decentralized application and smart contract developers from using the Ethereum network as the foundational infrastructure layer for building their applications and smart contracts. If decentralized application and smart contract developers abandon the Ethereum blockchain for other blockchain or digital asset networks or protocols for whatever reason, the value of ether could be negatively affected. Moreover, because digital assets, including ether, have been in existence for a short period of time and are continuing to develop, there may be additional risks in the future that are impossible to predict as of the date of this report. A temporary or permanent “fork” could adversely affect the value of the Shares. The Ethereum network operates using open-source protocols, meaning that any user can become a node by downloading the Ethereum Client and participating in the Ethereum network, and no permission of a central authority or body is needed to do so. In addition, anyone can propose a modification to the Ethereum network’s source code and then propose that the Ethereum network community support the modification. These proposed modifications to the Ethereum network’s source code, if adopted, could lead to forks (referred to as “planned forksˮ because they take place through a formal process). In the case of planned forks, the core developers, including those associated with or funded by the Ethereum Foundation, are able to access and alter the Ethereum network source code and, as a result, they are typically responsible for proposing quasi-official or widely publicized releases of updates and other changes to the Ethereum network’s source code (i.e., EIPs). Any user can propose an idea for modifying the Ethereum network’s source code, and the core developers are responsible for merging the proposed idea into the EIP repository on GitHub, where it formally becomes an EIP. However, the release of proposed updates to the Ethereum network’s source code by core developers does not guarantee that the updates will be automatically adopted. The developers of each Ethereum Client must agree to implement the EIP’s changes to the Ethereum network in the source code for their respective client software, nodes must accept the changes made available by the developers of the Ethereum Client software they use by choosing to individually download the modified Ethereum Client software, and ultimately a critical mass of validators and users - such as dApp and smart contract developers, as well as end users of dApps and smart contracts, and anyone else who transacts on the Ethereum blockchain or Ethereum network - must support the shift, or the upgrades will lack adoption. 17 Table of Contents Typically, in the case of a planned fork, once the EIPs are formally introduced by being merged into the EIP repository on GitHub, a robust debate within the Ethereum community as to the advisability of the proposed change ordinarily follows. Assuming the core developers at the protocol level and the developers of individual Ethereum Clients reach a broad consensus among themselves in favor of introducing the change into the respective source code they are responsible for developing and maintaining, the source code modification will be introduced and made available to download. A modification of the Ethereum network’s source code is only effective with respect to the Ethereum nodes that download it and modify their Ethereum Clients accordingly, and in practice such decisions are heavily influenced by the preferences of validators and users. Typically, after a modification is introduced and if a sufficiently broad critical mass of users and validators support the modification and nodes download the modification into their individual Ethereum Clients, the change is implemented and the Ethereum network continues to operate uninterrupted, assuming there are no software issues (e.g., bugs, outages, etc.). However, if less than a sufficiently broad critical mass (in practice, amounting to a substantial majority) of users and validators support the proposed modification and nodes refuse to download the modification to their Ethereum Clients, and the modification is not backwards compatible with the Ethereum blockchain or network or the Ethereum Clients of nodes prior to their modification, the consequence would be what is known as a “hard fork” of the Ethereum network, with one group of nodes running the pre-modified software, with users and validators continuing to use the pre-modified software, while the other group would adopt and run the modified software. The effect of such a hard fork would be the existence of two versions of the Ethereum network running in parallel on separate networks using separate blockchain ledgers, yet lacking interchangeability. In practice, in a hard fork, the two networks would compete with each other for developers, node operators, users, validators, and adoption, potentially to their mutual detriment (for example, if the number of validators on each network is too small leading to security concerns, as discussed below, or if the number of users on each is reduced compared to the number of users of the single pre-fork blockchain network). Debates relating to hard forks can be contentious and hard fought among network participants and can lead to ill will. Another possible result of a hard fork is an inherent decrease in the level of security due to significant amounts of validating power remaining on one network or migrating instead to the new forked network. After a hard fork, it may become easier for an individual validator or validating pool’s validating power to exceed 50% of the total on either network, thereby making them both more susceptible to attack. A future fork in the Ethereum network could adversely affect the value of the Shares or the ability of the Trust to operate. A fork could also adversely affect the price of ether at the time of announcement or adoption or subsequently. For example, the announcement of a hard fork could lead to increased demand for the pre-fork digital asset, in anticipation that ownership of the pre-fork digital asset would entitle holders to a new digital asset following the fork. The increased demand for the pre-fork digital asset may cause the price of the digital asset to rise. After the hard fork, it is possible the aggregate price of the two versions of the digital asset running in parallel would be less than the price of the digital asset immediately prior to the fork. Alternatively, as with any change to software code, software upgrades and other changes to the source code or protocols of the Ethereum network could fail to work as intended or could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, or security risks, create problematic economic incentives which incentivize behavior which has a negative effect on the Ethereum network’s users, validators, or the Ethereum network as a whole, or otherwise adversely affect, the speed, security, usability, or value of the Ethereum network or ether. If a fork caused operational problems for either post-fork network or blockchain, the digital assets associated with the affected network could lose some or all of their value. Furthermore, while the Sponsor will, as permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, determine which network is generally accepted as the Ethereum network and should therefore be considered the appropriate network for the Trust’s purposes, there is no guarantee that the Sponsor will choose the network and the associated digital asset that is ultimately the most valuable. Any of these events could therefore adversely impact the value of the Shares. On March 13, 2024, the Ethereum network underwent a planned fork called “Dencunˮ implementing a series of EIPs. EIP 4844, which some commentators perceive to be the most significant EIP within the Dencun series, is intended to improve the economics of Layer 2s by reducing transaction fees for Layer 2s who batch transactions executed on the Layer 2s and upload them as a batch (or as a single proof) onto the main Layer 1 Ethereum network. Among other objectives, the Dencun software upgrade was designed to provide Layer 2 scaling solutions a designated storage space on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, called Binary Large Objects (“blobsˮ), which attach large data chunks to transactions on the Layer 1 Ethereum network and are recorded on its blockchain. The data in blobs become inaccessible on the Layer 1 Ethereum network after a temporary period (three weeks), unlike the previous method of storing batched data from Layer 2s on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, which was stored permanently. The cost of accessing the temporary storage in blobs is expected by proponents of the Dencun upgrade to be substantially lower than the cost of storing the data on the Ethereum Layer 1 network permanently, making Layer 2s more cost-efficient to operate and, some commentators hope, more attractive as a scaling solution. Immediately following the upgrade, some Layer 2s reportedly experienced reduced transaction fees when batching transactions to the main Layer 1 Ethereum network, which in turn lowered the transaction costs for executing transactions on such Layer 2s, but this also is believed to have resulted in ether prices (ether being the native asset of the Layer 1 Ethereum network) dropping as well, due in part to the reduced demand for ether to pay the transaction costs of recording data on the Layer 1 Ethereum network. Decreased ether prices could have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares. Additionally, some Layer 2s, such as Blast, reportedly experienced outages and other disruptions in the aftermath of the Dencun upgrade, which in the case of Blast halted block production on the Blast Layer 2 blockchain for a period of time, though it was reportedly restored afterward. As with any change to software code, planned forks such as Dencun could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, security risks, problematic incentive structures, or otherwise fail to work as intended or achieve the expected benefits that proponents hope for in the short term or the long term, which could also have an adverse effect on adoption of the Ethereum network and the value of ether, and therefore the Shares. 18 Table of Contents In September 2022, the Ethereum network transitioned to a proof-of-stake consensus model, in an upgrade referred to as the “Merge.” Following the Merge, a hard fork of the Ethereum network occurred, as a small number of Ethereum validators and network participants planned to maintain the proof-of-work consensus mechanism that was removed as part of the Merge. This version of the network, which is not backwards compatible with the Ethereum Layer 1 blockchain, is considered a forked branch and was rebranded as “Ethereum Proof-of-Work.” To the extent significant developer talent, users or validators abandon the Ethereum Layer 1 network and adopt the Ethereum Proof-of-Work blockchain instead, the value of the Shares could be adversely affected. In December 2025, the Ethereum network implemented the Fusaka hard fork, which was designed to expand data capacity, reinforce defenses against denial-of-service attacks, and introduce new tools for developers and users, among others. The main feature of the Fusaka upgrade is a new way of handling the data in the blobs introduced by the Dencun upgrade, which was designed to create improvements for Layer 2s to store data on the main Ethereum network. The Ethereum core developers have announced a further planned upgrade, referred to as Glamsterdam, which is expected to be implemented in the second half of 2026. As with any change to software code, planned forks such as Glamsterdam could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, security risks, problematic incentive structures, or otherwise fail to work as intended or achieve the expected benefits that proponents hope for in the short term or the long term, which could also have an adverse effect on adoption of the Ethereum network and the value of ether, and therefore the Shares. As illustrated by Dencun, the Merge, Fusaka, and Glamsterdam, the Ethereum network regularly implements planned forks in an effort to achieve its development roadmap, advance the scalability process, and to improve the network generally. For example, in connection with the Ethereum development roadmap, the Ethereum network executed planned forks to transition from the initial Frontier development stage into the Homestead development stage in 2016; to transition from the Homestead development stage to the first sub-stage, Byzantium, of the Metropolis development stage in 2017; to transition from the Byzantium substage to the St. Petersburg sub-stage in early 2019; and to transition from the St. Petersburg sub-stage to the Istanbul sub-phase, in late 2019. In April 2021, the Ethereum network underwent the Berlin and Altair planned forks, among others. In 2022, Ethereum underwent the Bellatrix and Paris planned forks in connection with the Merge. In 2023, Ethereum underwent the Capella and Shanghai planned forks (collectively, Shapella), which enabled withdrawals of staked assets to the Ethereum Layer 1 blockchain mainnet for the first time (they had previously been locked on the Beacon Chain). On May 7, 2025, “Pectra” which is a combination of the Prague execution layer hard fork and the Electra consensus layer upgrade, went live. Pectra, among other changes, increased the maximum amount of ether that a validator can stake from 32 to 2,048, allowing validators to manage higher balances with the goals of potentially reducing costs; introducing account abstraction, allowing externally owned accounts (EOAs) to temporarily function like smart contracts; and reducing security risks and shortening the wait time for new validators. Any of these or future planned forks could fail to work as intended or could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, or security risks, or create problematic economic incentives which could increase behavior that has a negative effect on the Ethereum network’s nodes, users, validators, or the Ethereum network as a whole, or otherwise adversely affect, the speed, security, usability, or value of the Ethereum network or ether. Alternatively, such hard forks could be contentious, leading to a split and fracture in the Ethereum community to its collective detriment, as discussed above. Any such outcomes could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Forks may also occur as a digital asset network community’s response to a significant security breach. For example, in July 2016, Ethereum underwent a hard fork between the Layer 1 Ethereum network and a new digital asset running on a “forked” branch of the network, Ethereum Classic, as a result of the Ethereum network community’s response to a significant security breach. In June 2016, an anonymous hacker exploited a smart contract running on the Ethereum network to siphon approximately $60 million of ether held by The DAO, a decentralized autonomous organization, into a segregated account. In response to the hack, and after a contentious debate, most participants in the Ethereum community elected to adopt a hard fork that effectively reversed the hack, and this network constitutes the Layer 1 Ethereum network. However, a minority of users continued to develop the original blockchain, now referred to as “Ethereum Classic”, which is not backwards compatible with the Layer 1 Ethereum network and is considered a forked branch, with the native digital asset on that blockchain now referred to as Ethereum Classic, or ETC. ETC now trades on several digital asset platforms. Following the July 2016 hard fork between the Ethereum and Ethereum Classic networks, new security concerns surfaced. Replay attacks, in which transactions from one network were rebroadcast to nefarious effect on the other network, plagued Ethereum exchanges through at least October 2016. An Ethereum exchange announced in July 2016 that it had lost 40,000 Ethereum Classic, worth about $100,000 at that time, as a result of replay attacks. Similar replay attack concerns occurred in connection with the Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin Satoshi’s Vision networks split in November 2018, and security concerns could similarly surface in connection with future hard forks. An unplanned fork may also occur as a result of an unintentional or unanticipated software flaw in the various versions of Ethereum Client software that nodes run and use to access the Ethereum network. For example, such an unplanned fork reportedly occurred in the Geth client, which is a popular Ethereum Client that many nodes use to access the Ethereum network and whose developers are financially supported by the Ethereum Foundation. In November 2020, a bug was discovered in Geth (but not the other Ethereum Clients at the time, such as Besu, OpenEthereum, and Nethermind), and a patch was released that all nodes using the Geth client were supposed to download and apply simultaneously. However, not all nodes using Geth did so, resulting in the non-patched Geth nodes temporarily running a different version of the Ethereum blockchain than the patched Geth nodes and nodes using other Ethereum Clients. This temporarily created two conflicting versions of the Ethereum blockchain, causing the nodes using the non-patched Geth version to be unable to reach consensus with the rest of the nodes on the Ethereum blockchain, interrupting the non-patch Geth nodes’ access to the Ethereum network. For example, Infura, which is a node operator that provides services to major Ethereum smart contracts, wallet software providers like MetaMask, ether trading platforms, and other market participants, reportedly ran numerous nodes using the Geth client. Infura’s Geth client running nodes reportedly used the outdated, non-patched Geth version initially, which is said to have caused those nodes to be on the minority blockchain, impacting transaction execution, validation, and recording on the main Layer 1 Ethereum network for Infura’s customers - such as Ethereum‑based smart contracts, wallet providers like MetaMask, ether trading platforms, etc. - until Infura was able to apply the software update released by the Geth client developers to Infura’s nodes that use Geth as their Ethereum Client. Ultimately, the problem was reportedly fixed by releasing a new upgraded version of Geth that all nodes using the Geth client were to promptly download. This reportedly harmonized the conflicting versions and restored synchronization among Geth nodes, fixing the problem and restoring access to the Ethereum network, including for Infura and its customers. 19 Table of Contents In the future, if an accidental or unintentional fork similar to what happened within the Geth client in November 2020 were to reoccur within Geth (or any other major Ethereum Client), or were to happen to the Ethereum network as a whole (instead of being limited to a single Ethereum Client, in this case Geth), such a fork could lead to nodes, users and validators losing confidence in the Ethereum network and abandoning it in favor of other blockchain protocols. Furthermore, it is possible that, in a future unplanned fork, a substantial number of nodes, users and validators could adopt an incompatible version of the digital asset while resisting community-led efforts to merge the two chains, resulting in a permanent fork. Moreover, following the Merge, nodes on the Ethereum network must run two Ethereum Clients, i.e., an execution-layer client (“Execution Client”) and a consensus-layer client (“Consensus Client”) paired together, with the implementations selected at the discretion of the node operator. There are multiple groups independently developing and implementing their respective Execution Clients and Consensus Clients; while some individual Execution Clients or Consensus Clients are more popular or widely adopted than others, there remains heterogeneity among Ethereum Clients. Each Execution Client and Consensus Client needs to interoperate effectively with the other Execution Client and Consensus Client. Although this diversity of Ethereum Clients is perceived by some to promote decentralization of the Ethereum network, it comes at a potential cost: if there are any unanticipated or undiscovered flaws, bugs, software defects, or interoperability failures causing any individual Execution Client to fail to interoperate effectively with any other individual Execution Client or any Consensus Client, the Ethereum network as a whole could suffer an unplanned fork, major disruption, catastrophic outage, system failure, loss of confidence or adoption among users or validators, or a variety of other problems. Any of these events could cause ether to decline in value, adversely affecting the price of Shares. Protocols may also be cloned. Unlike a fork, which modifies an existing blockchain, and results in two competing networks, each with the same genesis block, a “clone” is a copy of a protocol’s codebase that results in an entirely new blockchain and new genesis block. Tokens are created solely from the new “clone” network and, in contrast to forks, holders of tokens of the existing network that was cloned do not receive any tokens of the new network. A “clone” results in a competing network that has characteristics substantially similar to the network it was based on, subject to any changes as determined by the developer(s) that initiated the clone. For example, following the DAO hack in July 2016, holders of ether voted on-chain to reverse the hack, effectively causing a hard fork. For the days following the vote, the price of ether rose from $11.65 on July 15, 2016 to $14.66 on July 21, 2016, the day after the first Ethereum Classic block was mined. A clone may also adversely affect the price of ether at the time of announcement or adoption or subsequently. For example, on November 6, 2016, Rhett Creighton, a Zcash developer, cloned the Zcash Network to launch Zclassic, a substantially identical version of the Zcash Network that eliminated the Founders’ Reward. For the days following the date the first Zclassic block was mined, the price of ZEC, the native cryptocurrency of Zcash, fell from $504.57 on November 5, 2016 to $236.01 on November 7, 2016 in the midst of a broader sell-off of ZEC beginning immediately after the Zcash Network launch on October 28, 2016. A determination that ether or any other digital asset is a “security” may adversely affect the value of ether and the value of the Shares, and result in potentially extraordinary, nonrecurring expenses to, or termination of, the Trust. Depending on its characteristics, a digital asset may be considered a “security” under the federal securities laws. The test for determining whether a particular digital asset is a “security” is complex and difficult to apply, and the outcome is difficult to predict. The SEC staff has reportedly provided informal assurances in the past to a handful of promoters that their digital assets are not securities. On the other hand, the SEC has brought enforcement actions against the issuers and promoters of several other digital assets on the basis that the digital assets in question were sold as investment contracts, and therefore were securities under the federal securities laws. The CFTC considers ether to be a commodity subject to its regulatory jurisdiction, and ether futures have been listed for years on CFTC‑regulated exchanges while cleared ether swaps have been listed for trading on CFTC‑regulated swap execution facilities not registered with the SEC without being deemed “mixed swaps” subject to joint CFTC and SEC jurisdiction to the Sponsor’s knowledge. Whether a digital asset is a security under the federal securities laws depends on whether it is included in the lists of instruments making up the definition of “security” in the Securities Act, the Exchange Act and the Investment Company Act. Digital assets as such do not appear in any of these lists, although each list includes the terms “investment contract” and “note,” and the SEC has typically analyzed whether a particular digital asset is a security by reference to whether it meets the tests developed by the federal courts interpreting these terms, known as the Howey and Reves tests, respectively. For many digital assets, whether or not the Howey or Reves tests are met is difficult to resolve definitively, and substantial legal arguments can often be made both in favor of and against a particular digital asset qualifying as a security under one or both of the Howey and Reves tests. Adding to the complexity, the SEC staff has indicated that the security status of a particular digital asset can change over time as the relevant facts evolve. On March 17, 2026, the SEC issued an interpretive release (the “Interpretive Release”) regarding the application of the federal securities laws to certain types of digital assets and certain transactions involving digital assets. In the Interpretive Release, the SEC stated that, based on its current understanding of the digital asset markets, ether is a “digital commodity” and not itself a security. Although the Interpretive Release represents the official position of the SEC, it is not itself a statute or binding rule, does not supersede or replace the Howey test, is based on the SEC’s current understanding of the digital asset markets, and may be refined, revised or expanded. In addition, a court, regulator, or future administration could take a different view, and future legislation, rulemaking, enforcement positions, judicial decisions or other developments could result in ether, the Trust, the Shares or transactions involving ether being treated differently than contemplated by the Interpretive Release. Any such developments could adversely affect the Trust and the value of the Shares. 20 Table of Contents As part of determining whether ether is a security for purposes of the federal securities laws, the Sponsor takes into account a number of factors, including the various definitions of “security” under the federal securities laws and federal court decisions interpreting elements of these definitions, such as the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in the Howey and Reves cases, as well as reports, orders, press releases, public statements and speeches by the SEC and its staff providing guidance on when a digital asset may be a security for purposes of the federal securities laws, and other materials relevant to the status of ether as a security (or not). Finally, the Sponsor discusses the security status of ether with its securities lawyers. Through this process the Sponsor believes that it is applying the proper legal standards in making a good faith determination that it believes ether is not presently a security under federal law notwithstanding the uncertainties inherent in the Howey and Reves tests. In light of these uncertainties and the fact-based nature of the analysis, the Sponsor acknowledges that ether may currently be a security, based on the facts as they exist today, or may in the future be found by the SEC or a federal court to be a security under the federal securities laws notwithstanding the Sponsor’s prior conclusion; and the Sponsor’s prior conclusion, even if reasonable under the circumstances and made in good faith, would not preclude legal or regulatory action based on the presence of a security. The Sponsor may dissolve the Trust if the Sponsor determines ether is a security under the federal securities laws, whether that determination is initially made by the Sponsor itself, or because the SEC or a federal court subsequently makes that determination. Because the legal tests for determining whether a digital asset is or is not a security often leave room for interpretation, for so long as the Sponsor believes there to be good faith grounds to conclude that the Trust’s ether is not a security, the Sponsor does not intend to dissolve the Trust on the basis that ether could at some future point be determined to be a security. Any enforcement action by the SEC or a state securities regulator asserting that ether is a security, or a court decision to that effect would be expected to have an immediate material adverse impact on the trading value of ether, as well as the Shares. This is because the business models behind most digital assets are incompatible with regulations applying to transactions in securities. The New York Attorney General alleged in a lawsuit filed in March 2023 that ether was a security under New York and federal securities law and that a crypto asset platform that deals in ether, unlawfully failed to register as a securities dealer under New York state law. However, the New York Attorney General alleged in the alternative in the same case that ether was a commodity under both New York state and federal law. If a digital asset is determined or asserted to be a security, it is likely to become difficult or impossible for the digital asset to be traded, cleared or custodied in the United States through the same channels used by non-security digital assets, which in addition to materially and adversely affecting the trading value of the digital asset is likely to significantly impact its liquidity and market participants’ ability to convert the digital asset into U.S. dollars. For example, in 2020 the SEC filed a complaint against the issuer of XRP, Ripple Labs, Inc., and two of its executives, alleging that they raised more than $1.3 billion through XRP sales that should have been registered under the federal securities laws, but were not. In the years prior to the SEC’s action, XRP’s market capitalization at times reached over $140 billion. However, in the weeks following the SEC’s complaint, XRP’s market capitalization fell to less than $10 billion, which was less than half of its market capitalization in the days prior to the complaint. Although the SEC and Ripple reached a settlement in August 2025 to resolve the enforcement action and to dismiss their respective court appeals, which has largely been viewed as positive in the digital assets market, there remains continued uncertainty as to the regulatory framework that will be applied by the SEC and courts to digital assets. Such uncertainty may remain until legislation providing a regulatory framework is adopted. There is currently legislation being considered that addresses this regulatory uncertainty, but it is unclear if the proposed legislation will be passed. In addition, if ether is determined to be a security, the Trust could be considered an unregistered “investment company” under SEC rules, which could necessitate the Trust’s liquidation. In this case, the Trust and the Sponsor may be deemed to have participated in an illegal offering of securities and there is no guarantee that the Sponsor will be able to register the Trust under the Investment Company Act at such time or take such other actions as may be necessary to ensure the Trust’s activities comply with applicable law, which could force the Sponsor to liquidate the Trust. Moreover, whether or not the Sponsor or the Trust were subject to additional regulatory requirements as a result of any SEC or federal court determination that its assets include securities, the Sponsor may nevertheless decide to terminate the Trust, in order, if possible, to liquidate the Trust’s assets while a liquid market still exists. For example, in response to the SEC’s action against the issuer of XRP, certain significant market participants announced they would no longer support XRP and announced measures, including the delisting of XRP from major digital asset trading platforms. The sponsor of the Grayscale XRP Trust subsequently dissolved this trust and liquidated its assets. If the SEC or a federal court were to determine that ether is a security, it is likely that the value of the Shares would decline significantly, and that the Trust itself may be terminated and, if practical, its assets liquidated. Regulatory changes or actions in foreign jurisdictions may affect the value of the Shares or restrict the use of one or more digital assets, validating activity or the operation of their networks or the digital asset platform market in a manner that adversely affects the value of the Shares. Various foreign jurisdictions have adopted, and may continue to adopt laws, regulations or directives that affect digital asset networks (including the Ethereum network), the digital asset markets (including the ether market), and their users, particularly digital asset platforms and service providers that fall within such jurisdictions’ regulatory scope. For example, if China or other foreign jurisdictions were to ban or otherwise restrict manufacturers’ ability to produce or sell semiconductors or hard drives in connection with ether validating, it would have a material adverse effect on digital asset networks (including the Ethereum network), the digital asset market, and as a result, impact the value of the Shares. 21 Table of Contents A number of foreign jurisdictions have recently taken regulatory action aimed at digital asset activities. China has made transacting in crypto assets illegal for Chinese citizens in mainland China, and additional restrictions may follow. Both China and South Korea have banned initial coin offerings entirely and regulators in other jurisdictions, including Canada, Singapore and Hong Kong, have opined that initial coin offerings may constitute securities offerings subject to local securities regulations. The United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority published final rules in October 2020 banning the sale of derivatives and exchange traded notes that reference certain types of digital assets, contending that they are “ill-suited” to retail investors citing extreme volatility, valuation challenges and association with financial crime. The United Kingdom’s Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (the “FSMA”) received royal assent in June 2023. According to publicly available government materials, the FSMA brings digital asset activities within the scope of existing laws governing financial institutions, markets and assets. In addition, the Parliament of the European Union approved the text of the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (“MiCA”) in April 2023, establishing a regulatory framework for digital asset services across the European Union. Certain parts of MiCA became effective as of June 2024 and the remainder became effective as of December 2024. MiCA is intended to serve as a comprehensive regulation of digital asset markets and imposes various obligations on digital asset issuers and service providers. The main aims of MiCA are industry regulation, consumer protection, prevention of market abuse and upholding the integrity of digital asset markets. Foreign laws, regulations or directives may conflict with those of the United States and may negatively impact the acceptance of one or more digital assets by users, merchants and service providers outside the United States and may therefore impede the growth or sustainability of the digital asset economy in the European Union, China, Japan, Russia and the United States and globally, or otherwise negatively affect the value of ether. Moreover, other events, such as the interruption in telecommunications or internet services, cyber-related terrorist acts, civil disturbances, war or other catastrophes, could also negatively affect the digital asset economy in one or more jurisdictions. For example, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 led to volatility in digital asset prices, with an initial steep decline followed by a sharp rebound in prices. The effect of any future regulatory change or other events on the Trust or ether is impossible to predict, and such change could be substantial and adverse to the Trust and the value of the Shares. Regulatory changes or interpretations could obligate the Trust, the Trustee or the Sponsor to register and comply with new regulations, resulting in potentially extraordinary, nonrecurring expenses to the Trust. Current and future federal or state legislation, CFTC and SEC rulemaking and other regulatory developments may impact the manner in which ether is treated. In particular, although the Interpretive Release classified ether as a “digital commodity” and not a security under the U.S. federal securities laws, ether may nonetheless in the future be classified by the CFTC as a “commodity interest” under the CEA, or a court or a future SEC administration could conclude that ether is a “security” under U.S. federal securities laws notwithstanding the Interpretive Release. The Sponsor, the Trustee and the Trust cannot be certain as to how future regulatory developments will impact the treatment of ether under the law. In the face of such developments, the required registrations and compliance steps may result in extraordinary, nonrecurring expenses to the Trust. If the Sponsor decides to terminate the Trust in response to the changed regulatory circumstances, the Trust may be dissolved or liquidated at a time that is disadvantageous to Shareholders. To the extent that ether is deemed to fall within the definition of a “commodity interest” under the CEA, the Trust, the Trustee and the Sponsor may be subject to additional regulation under the CEA and CFTC regulations. The Sponsor or the Trustee may be required to register as a commodity pool operator or commodity trading adviser with the CFTC and become a member of the National Futures Association (“NFA”) and may be subject to additional regulatory requirements with respect to the Trust, including disclosure and reporting requirements. These additional requirements may result in extraordinary, recurring and/or nonrecurring expenses of the Trust, thereby materially and adversely impacting the Shares. If the Sponsor or the Trustee determines not to comply with such additional regulatory and registration requirements, the Trustee will terminate the Trust. Any such termination could result in the liquidation of the Trust’s ether at a time that is disadvantageous to Shareholders. To the extent that ether is deemed to fall within the definition of a security under U.S. federal securities laws, the Trust, the Trustee and the Sponsor may be subject to additional requirements under the Investment Company Act and the Sponsor or the Trustee may be required to register as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act. Such additional registration may result in extraordinary, recurring and/or non-recurring expenses of the Trust, thereby materially and adversely impacting the Shares. If the Sponsor or the Trustee determines not to comply with such additional regulatory and registration requirements, the Trustee will terminate the Trust. Any such termination could result in the liquidation of the Trust’s ether at a time that is disadvantageous to Shareholders.