GIII Filings — G III Apparel Group Ltd /de/ - FilingSpy
GIII
G III Apparel Group Ltd /de/
A maker of clothing and outerwear behind some of fashion's most familiar names, G-III Apparel Group designs and sells apparel under owned brands like DKNY, Donna Karan, Karl Lagerfeld, and Vilebrequin, plus licensed labels such as Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger. It grew from a women's leather-coat business that Polish-born Holocaust survivor Aron Goldfarb started in New York's Garment District in 1956, later run by his son Morris. Its odd name dates to 1974, when the family firm was reorganized as G-III Leather Fashions — a simple three-initial label it kept as it grew.
Gross margin rose to 64.9% on a $102.7M IEEPA tariff refund, while Q2 revenue fell 8.2% to $536.0M.
A $102.7M tariff refund lifted to 64.9%, the highest in the company's reported history. fell 8.2% to $536.0M and rose to $1.50 as the refund benefit offset an $86.9M drop in Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger licensed sales. The quarter shows the licensed-brand decline is still underway, but a one-time refund reshaped the .
Key takeaways
rose 22.6 points to 64.9% ( $347.7M) largely due to a $102.7M expected recovery of IEEPA tariffs; excluding it, wholesale gross margin was 43.8% on price increases and owned-brand shift.
fell 8.2% to $536.0M, with wholesale down 8.5% to $514.8M as Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger licensed products dropped $86.9M, partly offset by a $42.9M rise in Donna Karan, BCBG, Converse, and French Connection.
Retail rose 11.5% to $40.6M on growth at Karl Lagerfeld Paris, DKNY stores, and the Donna Karan website.
Section summaries
Management's Discussion and Analysis
Net sales fell 8% to $536M, but gross margin surged to 64.9% driven by a $102.7M IEEPA tariff refund benefit.
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Wholesale decreased 8.5% to $514.8M, primarily due to an $86.9M decline in Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger licensed products, partially offset by a $42.9M increase in Donna Karan, BCBG, Converse, and French Connection products.
Retail rose 11.5% to $40.6M, driven by growth in Karl Lagerfeld Paris, DKNY stores, and the Donna Karan website, with up across these brands.
rose 782.4% to $1.50 and rose 757.5% to $66.5M, driven by the tariff refund benefit and lower after the 2024 note redemption.
increased 10.3% to $255.3M from $17.3M higher compensation and $6.4M in professional fees for the Marc Jacobs acquisition and legal matters.
was negative $2.0M versus $93.8M generated a year earlier, as a $139.5M tariff refund receivable sat in and had not yet produced cash.
Liquidity stood at $394.2M cash with $425.0M available under the and no ABL borrowings outstanding.
What changed
The FY2025 10-K flagged tracking Q1 FY2026 Calvin Klein/Tommy Hilfiger sales to measure replacement; this quarter shows the $86.9M licensed decline continuing, offset by $42.9M from Donna Karan, BCBG, Converse, and French Connection.
PVH Corp. litigation progressed: G-III sued in June 2025 and was countersued July 2025; this 10-Q confirms no loss estimate is provided, unchanged from prior flags.
FY2025 10-K flagged Q1 FY2026 under a new 10% global tariff; instead a $102.7M refund benefit drove margin to 64.9% versus 42.2% a year ago.
Retail loss exit: FY2025 retail loss was $5.0M on 218 stores; this quarter retail sales rose 11.5% to $40.6M, a continuation of the narrowing trend.
New risk factor added: the Marc Jacobs acquisition (not in FY2025 10-K risks) introduces deal-closing, joint-venture control, and transition risks, with ~$500M reserved.
What to watch
Next quarter's Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger licensed sales to see if owned brands and new licenses replace the $86.9M quarterly decline.
Receipt of the $139.5M tariff refund in cash and its effect on and liquidity.
Progression of PVH Corp. license litigation and any estimable loss or license impact.
Closing of the Marc Jacobs acquisition and buildup of standalone capabilities from LVMH infrastructure.
jumped to $347.7M (64.9% of sales) from $246.5M (42.2%), largely due to a $102.7M benefit from expected recovery of ; excluding this, wholesale improved to 43.8% on price increases and a shift to higher-margin owned brands.
expenses increased 10.3% to $255.3M, mainly from $17.3M higher compensation and $6.4M in professional fees related to the Marc Jacobs acquisition and legal matters.
Cash used in operations was $2.0M vs. $93.8M generated a year ago, largely due to a $139.5M tariff refund receivable recorded in prepaid expenses, which did not yet impact cash.
Liquidity remains strong with $394.2M cash and $425.0M available under the ; no borrowings were outstanding under the ABL facility.
Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures About Market Risk
There are no material changes to the disclosure made with respect to these matters in our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended January 31, 2026.
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There are no material changes to the disclosure made with respect to these matters in our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended January 31, 2026.
G-III is engaged in litigation with PVH Corp. over Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger license disputes; no loss estimate is provided.
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G-III filed a complaint against PVH Corp. and two subsidiaries on June 13, 2025, alleging breach of contract, breach of implied , and tortious interference related to the denial of a license extension for women's suits under Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger brands.
On July 30, 2025, Calvin Klein, Inc. and Tommy Hilfiger Licensing LLC filed a separate complaint against G-III in the same court, alleging breaches of the license agreements.
G-III believes the PVH subsidiaries' complaint is without merit and intends to vigorously defend against it.
Due to litigation uncertainty, the company is unable to estimate any reasonably possible loss or range of loss for these matters.
The Marc Jacobs acquisition introduces material risks around deal closing, joint-venture control, and post-close transition.
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The Marc Jacobs acquisition may not close, risking lost benefits from dedicated resources, incurred transaction costs, and reduced financial flexibility from reserving ~$500 million.
Our 50% stake in IPCo is non-controlled, with WHP appointing three of five board managers, and disagreements could hinder effective operation of the Marc Jacobs business.
The license to operate Marc Jacobs is terminable by IPCo upon payment default or material breach, and transfer restrictions limit our ability to exit the joint venture.
Post-close, we must transition from LVMH’s infrastructure under a temporary services agreement, with risks in building standalone capabilities and retaining key personnel.
We have no control over Marc Jacobs operations in China and Japan if those assets are sold or retained by IPCo, potentially harming global brand perception.